Although more politically stable than other regions, persistently high rates of poverty, poor governance, and the proliferation of transnational drug cartels and organised crime groups continue to impact security conditions throughout Latin America. The overall poverty rate in the region returned to its pre-pandemic level of approximately 29%, which still leaves more than 180 million people unable to meet their basic needs, according to UN estimates.
Poverty has been exacerbated by poor economic growth over the last year. Regional GDP growth for 2023 is expected to finalise at 1.7%, with slightly lower growth of 1.5 percent expected for 2024. Broken down by subregion, Mexico and Central America could see higher growth of approximately three percent, while South America is expected to see lower than expected growth of 1.2%.
Poverty and insecurity continue to drive record levels of migration throughout Central and South America. Panama recorded more than 520,000 migrants passing through the Darien Gap on its border with Colombia in 2023, double the number encountered in 2022. Although Venezuelan nationals comprised most of these migrants, a significant number of migrants from across Latin America and the Caribbean have opted to make the considerable journey northwards, with many heading to the US-Mexico border.
Number of migrants (in thousands)
Source: Congressional Research Service using U.S. Customs and Border Protection data, figure two sourced using FY 2021 data and is only representative of migration flows
The systemic issues facing Latin America have led to a series of political transitions throughout the last year, with consequential elections in Argentina, Guatemala, Ecuador, and elsewhere. Elections will play prominent roles throughout 2024, with national polls occurring in Mexico, El Salvador, Panama and Venezuela.
Overall rates of civil unrest declined slightly across Latin America in 2023. Incidents of protests, riots, and other forms of unrest fell by approximately eight percent in the last year compared to 2022. This decline is most apparent in countries like Peru – where violent protests over the arrest of former President Pedro Castillo in late 2022 and early 2023 failed to maintain momentum – and in Ecuador – where Indigenous-led protests lost their salience amid rising crime and the collapse of President Guillermo Lasso’s administration. Despite this relative decline, existing socioeconomic inequalities and concerns about corruption and ineffective governance have spurred new waves of protest movements and outbreaks of civil unrest.
Heatmap of reported unrest in 2023
Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)
The most pronounced unrest has centered on Guatemala, where considerable political tensions began following the June 2022 general election. Anti-corruption candidate Bernardo Arevalo defeated First Lady Sandra Torres in the second round of the country’s presidential election, promising to impose wide ranging reforms aimed at reducing socioeconomic inequality and stopping Guatemala’s perceived democratic backsliding. Despite Arevalo’s relatively decisive victory over Torres, he and his Seed Movement party have faced considerable resistance from the Public Ministry and other elements, which have sought to overturn Arevalo’s victory and prevent an orderly transition of power.
The Public Ministry’s efforts to block Arevalo’s incoming administration have resulted in frequent outbreaks of grassroots demonstrations in support of Arevalo and the Seed Movement, largely driven by Indigenous groups. Protesters have blocked roads and highways throughout the capital Guatemala City and other major urban areas, often prompting significant disruptions to intercity travel and commerce. Demonstrations have occurred peacefully, but violent attacks on protesters in early October – in which an armed group killed one person and injured four others in Malacatan town – has raised concerns about a possible rise in political violence in the coming months.
In late December, Guatemala’s Constitutional Court ruled against the Public Ministry and its efforts to annul the general election results, stating that Arevalo must be allowed to take office on 14 January. This development has allayed some concerns regarding a potential procedural coup against Arevalo; however, his incoming administration is still likely to face significant institutional resistance. Attempts to block reforms could prompt renewed civil unrest across Guatemala, especially if key anti-corruption and democratic measures fail to make it out of the legislature, where the political establishment retains control.
Other notable outbreaks of civil unrest have occurred in Panama, where public dissatisfaction with a lucrative copper mining contract led to the largest protest movement there in decades. Demonstrations began in October after the government announced plans to grant a Canadian mining company a 20-year extension on extraction rights at the Cobre copper mine. Indigenous groups and environmental activists criticised the government for quickly agreeing to the extension despite various environmental concerns and accusations that the deal was too generous to foreign business interests. Protesters blocked the Pan-American Highway and other major roads for weeks demanding the government cancel the contract. Although peaceful, two individuals were shot and killed by a disgruntled motorist at a roadblock outside the capital Panama City, underscoring tensions over the disruptive nature of the protests.
In late November, the Panama Supreme Court struck down the mining contract as unconstitutional after weeks of protests. Following the ruling, President Laurentino Cartizo ordered the closure of the Cobre mine and placed a pause on all new mining contracts until further notice. Annual output at Cobre represents approximately three percent of Panama’s GDP; the economic impact of closing the mine underscores the growing power of Indigenous and environmental movements in Panama, as well as in Latin America more broadly. The success of the demonstrations in Panama could spur activists in other countries to stage their own protests over controversial industrial projects and environmental concerns – including in Brazil, Colombia, and other resource-rich countries across Latin America.
Economic uncertainty, rising crime, and other issues have led to political transitions throughout Latin America in the last year. The region was witnessed a return of left-wing governments in recent years.
Economic conditions continued to deteriorate in Argentina throughout 2023, with annualized inflation exceeding 160% in November 2023, one of the highest rates in the world. Spiraling prices have pushed Argentina’s poverty rate to more than 40% and increased both political and economic uncertainty. Growing dissatisfaction over the government’s handling of the economy and concerns about Argentina’s future led to libertarian populist Javier Milei’s victory over Finance Minister Sergio Massa in the November presidential election. Milei campaigned on stabilising Argentina’s economy through significant economic overhauls – including the dollarisation of the economy, the abolition of the Central Bank, and the privatisation of state-owned companies, among other measures.
Shortly after taking office, large protests broke out in the capital Buenos Aires in response to a series of economic measures by Milei’s administration – including the devaluation of the Argentine peso, spending cuts, and other measures dubbed “economic shock therapy” by Milei. The demonstrations underscore the potential for a rise in civil unrest throughout Argentina – including protests and labour actions – in response to Milei’s economic reforms and other controversial policies. While Milei’s economic overhauls may be necessary given the current state of Argentina’s economy, cuts to social welfare and government services could further elevate tensions and mobilise centrist and left-wing opposition to Milei’s administration.
Kidnapping remains a considerable threat across Latin America due to the prevalence of organised crime groups and corruption among local government officials and law enforcement. Mexico and Colombia accounted for the majority of kidnapping incidents in 2023, although Ecuador, Brazil, and Venezuela have also witnessed elevated rates of kidnapping compared to other countries in Latin America. The rise in kidnappings in countries like Chile, and Peru often stems from the broader expansion of Colombian, Venezuelan, and even Mexican organised crime groups into new territories, rather than the growth of domestic organised crime groups. Ecuador is a notable exception, where domestic cartel factions have demonstrated enhanced cooperation and capabilities throughout 2023.
In Mexico, kidnappings continue to pose a threat to civilians – including both local and foreign nationals. A serious incident occurred in March when armed cartel members kidnapped four American citizens in Matamoros city, Tamaulipas, that had crossed the border from Texas for a medical procedure. Two of the individuals were later released; the other two were killed during the abduction. The Scorpions – a faction of the Gulf Cartel – handed over several of its members after the incident and stated that the kidnappings were a case of mistaken identity carried out by insubordinate members.
Other incidents in Mexico have been the result of reprisals from cartels. In December, members of the Familia Michoacana group kidnapped 14 people from Texcaltitlan village, State of Mexico, after agricultural workers in the village killed 10 of the cartel’s members over continued attempts to extort them. Cartel reprisal kidnappings are often directed at security forces and government officials, although the unprecedented nature of the killings in Texcaltitlan likely factored into Familia Michoacana’s response.
2023 witnessed a surge in kidnappings in Colombia despite ongoing peace talks between the government and the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Some notable kidnappings occurred in 2023, including the November abduction of the father of a prominent Liverpool football player by the ELN in Barrancas. The player’s father and his wife were eventually released by the ELN after widespread backlash domestically and abroad.
Overall, the kidnapping threat in Colombia remains dynamic, and future developments will likely hinge on the outcome of peace talks between President Gustavo Petro’s government and armed leftist groups. In December, Estado Mayor Centro (EMC) – the dissident faction of FARC – announced it would suspend kidnaps for ransom while it negotiates a reconciliation agreement with the Petro administration. This has resulted in at least 10 hostages being freed, although the EMC’s commitment to eschew kidnappings will depend on the government following through on various concessions in 2024. The EMC’s commitment to at least temporarily halt kidnappings is a positive development; however, the ELN has made no such commitments, nor have other rebel and criminal groups in Colombia.
Reported annual kidnaps Colombia
Source: Colombia Ministry of Defence
The growth of transnational drug cartels and other organised crime groups continues to pose a threat to domestic and regional security across Latin America. Although traditionally associated with Mexico, Colombia, and other countries that have long been plagued by cartel violence, the issue has spread to countries that had previously been spared to most significant impacts related to transnational drug crime.
The threat posed by Latin America’s increasingly empowered drug cartels is most apparent in Ecuador, where violent crime rates continue to climb amid worsening conflict between the government and rival cartel factions. The country is now among the top three most violent counties in Latin America and the Caribbean, spurred on by a record number of homicides. The murder rate in the port city of Guayaquil – Ecuador’s main trafficking hub – rose more than 80% in 2023, while central Los Rios province – where cocaine from Colombia is trafficked into the country – witnessed a spike in homicides of more than 150%.
The situation in Ecuador has been worsened by political instability, which has left the government unable to effectively address spiraling crime rates. In May, then-President Guillermo Lasso dissolved the National Assembly and called for early elections to avoid an impeachment inquiry into alleged corruption charges. During the campaign to replace Lasso, gunmen assassinated presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, an outspoken critic of supposed ties between the government and organised crime. Authorities arrested six Colombian nationals who allegedly carried out the hit; however, the suspects were later killed in Guayaquil’s Littoral Penitentiary – where dozens of people have died in prison riots in recent years. The investigation into Villavicencio's assassination was never completed, underscoring the relative impunity in which cartels operate, spurred on by corruption in the military, national police, and local governments.
Incumbent President Daniel Noboa was elected in the October run-off despite barely registering support in opinion polls ahead of the first round of voting. Noboa has vowed to address violent crime through various security initiatives and economic reforms, although few tangible measures have been imposed since he took office. Former President Lasso’s decision to dissolve the legislature and end his term prematurely means that Noboa will only serve until the next presidential election in May 2025, giving him little time to correct Ecuador’s economic and security declines. The coming year will be key test for Noboa and his administration as the government tries to stem the rise in violent crime and restrain the cartel operations across Ecuador.
In other countries, experiences with organised crime have been mixed. While the national homicide rate in Mexico continued to decline gradually in 2023 compared to its record high in 2019, the official number of murders is suspected of being an undercount. In the capital Mexico City – where the official homicide rate has fallen by more than 50% in the last four years – the number of disappearances has increased by more than 1,000% to 3,598 in the same period. Nationwide, the number of disappearances has risen to more than 9,500 a year, although the precise figure is difficult to ascertain given supposed errors in the federal government’s registry of more than 110,000 missing persons.
Mexico (National) reported homicide cases
Source: Data taken from the National Centre of Information (CNI)
Mexico City reported homicide cases
Insecurity in Mexico has manifested itself in new ways, including a rise in mass shootings in some parts of the country. In Guanajuato state, 12 people were killed in the town of Salvatierra after an armed group opened fire at a Christmas party at a local hacienda. The incident was one of several massacres in Mexico throughout 2023. In May, gunman opened fire at spectators at a car rally in Baja California state – killing 10 people and wounding 10 others.
Overall, areas along the Mexico-US border continue to see the worst violence. Reductions in crime elsewhere in Mexico are often offset by an increase in homicides, kidnappings, and extortions along the border. These increases stem from continued conflict over drug smuggling routes and the growing role that cartels and organised crime play in trafficking migrants across the border into the US. Ciudad Juarez recorded at least 1,163 homicides in 2023, approximately 10% more than the preceding year. Authorities attribute this rise in homicides to conflict between rival cartels over human trafficking routes, which have become even more lucrative amid a surge in irregular migration into the US. Officials also cite the growing prevalence of synthetic drugs – including fentanyl – which cartels increasingly distribute and sell locally in Ciudad Juarez.
Persistent insecurity and the emergence of new threats stemming from Mexico’s long running war on drugs are expected to play outsized roles in the upcoming 2 June presidential election, with some polls showing that security is a top issue for voters. Incumbent President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador – who has pursued economic growth rather that military force to address violent crime – is ineligible for another term. The ruling Morena party has nominated Claudia Sheinbaum – the former Head of Government for Mexico City – as its candidate to succeed Lopez Obrador in the upcoming election. Sheinbaum will face former Senator Xochitl Galvez – the opposition’s unity candidate. Early polling suggests that Sheinbaum is the frontrunner; however, her campaign will need to contend with unpopular aspects of Lopez Obrador’s administration – including its spending on infrastructure projects of questionable utility, high rates of violent crime and corruption, and dissatisfaction with federal security policies.
Central and South America have historically witnessed very low rates of external conflict compared to the rest of the world, particularly in the past century. While this trend continued throughout 2023, tensions between Venezuela and Guyana over the disputed Essequibo region pose concerns about potential interstate conflict in the coming year.
On 3 December, Venezuelan voters overwhelmingly approved a referendum put forth by President Nicolas Maduro’s government that would incorporate the oil-rich Essequibo region – which comprises more than two-thirds of Guyana – into Venezuela. Tensions over the region have persisted for decades, although Venezuela reasserted its claims to Essequibo following the discovery of oil deposits there almost a decade ago.
Following the referendum, Maduro’s government updated maps to refer to Essequibo as an internal province and appointed a provisional governor to administer the region. Venezuela also ordered Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) – its state oil company – to begin mapping Essequibo for oil exploration and extraction. Moreover, the National Assembly is also expected to draft legislation nullifying any contracts granted to foreign oil companies in Essequibo by the Guyanese government – although these statues have yet to be ratified.
Venezuela’s moves to effectively annex Essequibo caused regional tensions to escalate, with the US sending a delegation of Defense Department officials to Guyana as a show of support to Guyanese President Ifraan Ali. Guyana placed its military on heightened alert in response to Venezuela’s actions after the referendum, while Brazil sent reinforcements to its border with Venezuela to deter a possible incursion into Essequibo via Brazilian territory.
The aftermath of Venezuela’s referendum on the sovereignty of Essequibo raised concerns about a potential regional conflict over the issue, particularly given Maduro’s provocations and Guyana and Brazil’s reactions to them. Despite these concerns, the situation stabilised somewhat after Maduro and Ali agreed that their counties would not use military force to solve the dispute in regional talks brokered by the US, Brazil, and other foreign stakeholders. Venezuela also agreed to allow the arbitration process via the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to proceed, despite earlier rejecting the court’s jurisdiction on the matter.
The unresolved nature of the Essequibo dispute means that tensions could escalate further in the coming year in response to rulings by the ICJ or other developments. It remains unclear if Maduro truly intends to annex Essequibo or otherwise exert Venezuela’s claims to oil and gas deposits there. The Essequibo referendum comes amid efforts by Maduro’s government to repair relations with the US in return for sanctions relief. In late 2023, the US began lifting some sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector to incentivise Maduro’s government to hold an open and fair presidential election in 2024. This easing of sanctions allowed PDVSA to grow its exports by approximately 12% over the last year. Using military force to achieve its desired aims in Essequibo could unnecessarily harm Venezuela-US relations at a time when détente between the two sides has strengthened Venezuela‘s energy sector.
Still, Maduro’s commitment to repairing bilateral relations with the US remains uncertain. In late October, the Supreme Justice Tribunal nullified the results of an opposition presidential primary amid accusations of voting irregularities and other alleged misconduct. Although subsequent negotiations resulted in Maduro’s government agreeing to review the ruling, it remains unclear whether opposition presidential candidate Maria Corina Machanda will ultimately be allowed to run. Failure to reinstate Machanda may result in the reapplication of US sanctions and encourage Maduro to pursue annexation of Essequibo to drum up nationalist sentiment and unilaterally expand Venezuela’s oil prospects.
