In 2023, the Asia-Pacific (APAC) region faced several security threats. Terrorist and insurgent groups continued to disrupt stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan through enduring terror campaigns. In the Mekong sub-region of Myanmar violence intensified, where a civil war has been raging since February 2021. 2023 also saw an escalation of civil unrest in South Asia, stemming from deep political divisions, irregularities, and corruption, particularly in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Pacific Islands were also at the forefront – notably in Papua New Guinea (PNG). Lastly, the risk of kidnapping remained persistent in Afghanistan.
Additionally, in Far East Asia and in the South China Sea tensions between states have continued to deepen. In particularly, tensions have risen between North and South Korea, between China and the other littoral states of the South China Sea – Taiwan and the Philippines most markedly – and between Beijing and other capitals such as Tokyo and Delhi. These tensions are likely to serve as a backdrop to the region’s growing security issues in 2024.
Long-standing potential regional conflict flashpoints, namely the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the South China and East China Seas, and the India-China border, all remained unresolved in 2023.
On the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's military activity continued unabated, with Pyongyang testing an array of ballistic missiles close to the South Korean border. The North also made three attempts to install a reconnaissance satellite, Malligyong-1, into orbit; the third attempt, launched in November, proving successful. South Korea's President Yoon Suk Yeol and US President Joe Biden quickly condemned the launch, labelling it a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Pyongyang subsequently moved to suspend a five-year military pact with Seoul, and dispatched considerable military forces and equipment to the border, which prompted the South to resume aerial surveillance of the North Korean territory. In December, North Korea fired its most advanced long-range intercontinental ballistic missile, following meetings between South Korean and US officials on how to respond to a nuclear attack by the North.
This cycle of escalating provocations is almost certain to continue into 2024. Although Kim Jong Un's administration did not test a nuclear weapon in 2023, given the growing bilateral technological partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow, it is likely that increased technological transfer will heighten the possibility of a nuclear test in 2024. Such developments would only exacerbate international tensions and could possibly prompt the Joe Biden administration, in the run-up to the US presidential election in November 2024, to reinforce the US-South Korea military alliance. A renewed US commitment to the South's security would be warmly welcomed by Seoul, but with fears that the 2024 US presidential election could see the return of an isolationist foreign policy under Donald Trump, Seoul may revive its desire to develop its own nuclear weapons programme.
Tensions between China and Taiwan remained high during 2023. During the past year, the People's Republic of China (PRC) expressed deep concern over the increasing frequency of meetings between prominent US legislators and senior Taiwanese political representatives. In April, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen visited former Speaker of the House of Representatives Kevin McCarthy in his home state of California. The closed-door meeting made McCarthy the highest-ranking official to meet a Taiwanese president on US soil since 1979, the year Washington established diplomatic relations with the PRC. Days later, the Eastern Theatre Command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), launched a three-day air and sea military operation across the Taiwan Strait, code-named “United Sharp Sword”.
Twenty-nine of the forty-two warplanes crossed the median line, the unofficial border in the middle of the Taiwan Strait. Frigates, destroyers, and amphibious assault ships also took part in the exercises, carrying out live firing and anti-missile drills. As part of the exercises, the destroyer 052D Taiyuan reportedly came within 24 nautical miles of the island.
Further tensions have been heightened by the acceleration of regular Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) by Taiwan's traditional and stable allies. While the US Navy passes warships through the Taiwan Strait monthly, the dispatch of the USS Milius, an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, in April was significant because it came just days after the PLA ended its war games around the island. In November, an Australian warship, the Toowoomba, sailed south through the narrow waterway, prompting condemnation from the Chinese Ministry of Defence.
Sustained US engagement and more frequent naval outings by its allies have led Beijing to fear that the West is gradually creating the conditions for Taiwan's permanent separation from the mainland. This growing unease is further amplified by the fact that Taiwan is due to hold the next round of national elections on 13 January 2024, when the Taiwanese people will choose a successor to President Tsai Ing-wen. In the current political climate, the two opposition parties - the Kuomintang and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP), both of which advocate reopening communication with the CCP – are likely to lose out to Vice-President Lai Ching-te, who has been leading the polls since the start of the campaign. According to a poll commissioned on 28 December, the KMT and TPP candidates both had a 20% win probability respectively, compared to 28.9% for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nominee.
If Lai becomes Taiwan's eighth president, it will be a setback for the CCP, which expects the DPP to continue to promote a Taiwanese identity in its foreign and defence policies. This backdrop is likely to further complicate President Xi Jinping's efforts to revive the 1992 consensus – a meeting between the CCP and KMT in Hong Kong in 1992, during which the two sides laid the diplomatic foundation for semi-official cross-strait exchanges.
Taiwan Strait military balance, ground forces
Source: US Department of Defence, Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, Annual Report to Congress
As the Chinese military continues to develop its capabilities, the risk remains that the PLA will keep accelerating military exercises throughout 2024 in an ongoing effort to enhance its operational situational awareness for a Taiwan military offensive. Given this growing security risk, US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin, in conjunction with his Philippine counterpart Gilbert Teodoro, announced in April that the US would have access to four additional military bases, notably in the northern Philippines, in the provinces of Cagayan and Isabela, just 93 miles from Taiwan.
Amid deepening defence ties between Manila and Washington, the CCP has intensified its maritime encroachments across reefs within Philippine waters of the South China Sea. Over the past year, Sino-Philippine tensions have focused particularly on the Scarborough and Second Thomas shoals, as well as on Whitsun reef, three reefs believed to be rich in oil and gas deposits, as well as abundant marine life. Beijing claims the reefs and almost the entire sea based on its 'nine-dash line'.
Map illustrating extent of Chinese claims in the SCS and notable maritime features
Source: AFP
During the past year, Chinese vessels of the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) have actively challenged Philippine naval operations in the area or positioned themselves to deny access to military craft and civilian fishing vessels. Tensions reached a worrying point on 15 December, when the Armed Forces of the Philippines reported that as many as 11 Chinese maritime militia vessels were stationed near the Second Thomas Shoal as Philippine vessels passed through the area.
China's maritime coercion over scattered islands in the East China Sea has inflicted considerable concern on Japan during 2023. This reached an all-time high, particularly around the Senkaku Islands, northeast of Taiwan. Data recently released by the Japanese Coast Guard revealed that Chinese government vessels entered the area 352 days out of 365. This is the highest figure since records began in 2008, and an increase of 16 days on the previous record of 336 days set in 2022.
Friction along the India-China border remains high following a series of sporadic clashes that erupted in 2020 for the first time in several decades. Competition for influence in South Asia and globally has spilled over into the border dispute, fuelling a build-up of military capabilities and an increased risk of further clashes. There are now more than 100,000 new soldiers on both sides of the border. Over the past year, the two nuclear powers have engaged in a frantic competition to expand infrastructure. Along the disputed 2,100-mile border – also known as the Line of Actual Control – China is rushing to complete construction of a bridge over the Pangong Tso, which will link the north bank, in what India claims as its Ladakh region, to the south bank in Tibet. In Arunachal Pradesh, India is building an east-west road corridor, the Trans-Arunachal Highway, which will run the length of the state, as well as tunnels, air bases and heliports.
India's Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, is expected to be re-elected for a record third term in the upcoming 2024 general election. Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi, both nationalist leaders, are likely to intensify their competition, with the risk of skirmishes escalating into full-blown clashes along the disputed Line of Actual Control remaining a distinct possibility in 2024.
Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to be flashpoints where foreign companies face an elevated risk to their activities. Despite the Taliban transitioning from an armed insurgent group to the ruling government of Afghanistan, terrorist organisations, predominately, Islamic State’s (IS) regional affiliate, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (IS-K), were able to operate with relative impunity in 2023.
IS-K has targeted religious minority groups, particularly Hazaras, and has adopted extreme tactics such as suicide bombings to maximise its impact. On 7 November, a deadly suicide bus attack in the Daht-I Barchi district, a Hazara-Shiite populated area of Kabul city, resulted in the killing of seven civilians and wounded close to twenty others. IS-K has also claimed the killings of Taliban officials, including the governor of Balkh province and the governor of Badakhshan province.
Afghanistan's neighbour Pakistan saw an increase in the number of terrorist attacks in 2023. During the month of August, Pakistan saw an 83% increase in terrorist incidents, with 99 terrorist events recorded. This is the highest number recorded in a single month since November 2014, according to a report compiled by the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS).
Comparative fatalities from violence in Pakistan. Year wise | province wise 2019 to Sept 2023
Source: Center for Research & Security Studies, Security Forces’ Losses Hit 8-Year High in First 9 Months of 2023, Q3 Records 57% Surge in Violence: CRSS Security Report
The Pakistan Taliban, formally called the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), an umbrella organisation of various Islamist armed militant groups, reportedly carried out most of the acts, using its base in Afghanistan to resurrect its Jihadist insurgency that Pakistan quelled almost a decade ago. The most lethal incident took place in January 2023, when a TTP suicide bomber dressed as a policeman attacked a Peshawar Mosque, killing 101 people, most of them police officers. Most recently, in December, the TTP carried out an attack on a joint police and security forces post in the Nalla Bara Tehsil, outside Peshawar, northwest of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Two soldiers were killed and five wounded.
By allowing the TTP to use its hideout in Afghanistan to commit acts of violence in Pakistan, the Taliban are breaking their promise to prevent terrorism emanating from Afghan soil and thus honour the Doha Accords which paved the way for the withdrawal of US forces in August 2021. As a result, Pakistan, once the leading advocate of the international recognition of the Taliban, is becoming increasingly frustrated with it, as the TTP's attacks show no sign of abating.
IS-K concentrated its attacks in Peshawar, Bajaur, Mastung and Rawalpindi – mainly targeting political rallies. On 30 July, IS-K carried out a suicide attack at an election rally for the Pakistani political party Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl (JUI-F), killing 54 people, including a JUI-F regional leader. The attack took place in the Bajaur region, northwest Pakistan.
The ethno-separatist Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) also continued to operate in the southern province of Baluchistan. Increased levels of violence in Baluchistan are directly linked to ongoing Chinese investment in the province under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Ethnic Baloch militants have exploited the perception that Chinese investment under the BRI has not benefited locals. The western section of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through the region, where Baloch militants have carried out a series of attacks targeting Chinese economic interests. On 13 August, two gunmen attacked a convoy of Chinese engineers in the southern port city of Gwadar, where China has developed a seaport. If the pace of these attacks continues to accelerate, China's security forces may be in greater demand to ensure the safety of Chinese citizens and projects in 2024.
Although most protests in South Asia and Pacific Islands were peaceful, there have been occasions where protests have escalated into violence.
A confluence of economic and political factors have raised the likelihood of protests escalating into unrest in countries such as Bangladesh, India, and Papua New Guinea. Periods of unrest have been most pronounced during electoral periods.
After a police crackdown in late October, anti-government demonstrations led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) took a more violent turn. In November, the frequency of violent BNP demonstrations surged to more than three times that of October. The demonstrations culminated in a massive rally in Dhaka, drawing over 100,000 participants, who voiced demands for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's resignation and the formation of a neutral caretaker government to oversee the January 2024 elections. The escalating political unrest and the boycott by a major opposition party have raised serious concerns in Western capitals about the integrity and inclusivity of the recent January election. With Prime Minister Hasina re-elected for an unprecedented fourth consecutive term, the political climate remains tense and polarised, with lingering questions about the legitimacy and transparency of the electoral process.
In the November legislative elections in India's Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan states, saw the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) secure victories, while the Indian National Congress (INC) won in Telangana. BJP gains across the Hindi heartland are viewed as pivotal ahead of the 2024 general elections, with its Hindutva rhetoric notably influencing the outcome in Madhya Pradesh. However, the electoral process in Madhya Pradesh was marred by heightened civil unrest, characterised by clashes between the BJP and INC. Additionally, Chhattisgarh witnessed increased Naxal-Maoist activity, contributing to the overall rise in civil unrest, with attacks on officials surpassing the 2022 total during November.
In PNG's Lagaip Open electorate, supplementary elections were held in early November after a prior cancellation in July 2022 due to violence. The electoral process contributed to a notable surge in violence in Enga province, with 11 incidents reported in November compared to two in October. The decision to relocate the vote-counting process to another province, later reversed, sparked significant unrest and resulted in at least seven fatalities in the provincial capital of Wabag on November 14 and 15. Despite concerns about irregularities, threats against polling officials, and ballot manipulation, the candidate from the Pangu Party, aligned with Prime Minister James Marape, was declared the winner. Subsequent to the announcement, violence erupted, leading to the burning of a school and the death of two individuals at the hands of supporters of a losing candidate.
Over the past year, kidnappings were most widespread across Afghanistan and Pakistan.
During the reference period, kidnappings of foreign nationals were common in Afghanistan. North American and European nationals were the most targeted by the Taliban authorities, with several of them taken into custody. Recent abductions include three Britons, a Pole and a dozen Americans. These kidnappings are a sign that the Taliban are using foreigners as collateral for prisoner exchanges as they move to exert greater pressure on Biden and other leading European administrations to release billions of dollars of foreign reserves frozen by US and European financial sanctions - more than USD 9 billion remain held1 across American and European central banks.
Kidnappings of locals are also common. Afghans fleeing the Taliban are routinely abducted and tortured by gangs particularly along border provinces. These gangs often demand a ransom of USD 10,000. The most recent incident occurred in Nangarhar province, eastern Afghanistan, where a merchant was kidnapped by a local gang on 20 December.
Across the border in Pakistan, kidnapping rates were also high in 2023. Indeed, the country remained a kidnapping hotspot in fourth quarter of the year, albeit one where only a small proportion of cases were reported. A large proportion of kidnappings were conducted by local gangs, with the primary motive being financial. While earlier in the year all victims were nationals, there was a report of an attempted kidnapping of a foreign national in Karachi on 27 December. There has been a rise in politically motivated kidnapping throughout 2023, including by Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan. Notable cases included the kidnapping of four members of a polio survey team on 17 October in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Tank district. At least three cases of private sector workers’ kidnappings were reported in the final months of the year. While data is incomplete with the majority of incidents remaining unreported, the increase towards the end of 2023 likely reflects that militant groups have expanded their targets to include commercial actors.
1 Ibid
Internal conflict continued to threaten business operations in 2023. The scale and intensity of attacks were most widespread and enduring in Myanmar.
Myanmar’s civil war escalated particularly during the second half of 2023. On 27 October, the Three Brotherhoods Alliance - an anti-military alliance made up of the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) - launched Operation 1027 against the Tatmadaw, Myanmar's military, in Shan State, northern Myanmar. At the time of writing the Alliance has captured 422 bases and 20 towns from the Tatmadaw.
Anti-junta operations have rapidly spread to other parts of Myanmar. In the east, Karenni forces launched Operation 1111 and now control almost 80% of Kayah state. They are currently fighting in the capital, Loikaw. In western Myanmar, the Arakan Army has ended its ceasefire in Rakhine State and seized major bases, while Chin forces have made significant inroads along the Indian border and claim to have established civilian administration across 70% of the state.
Evidence suggests that the military junta is clearly overstretched. Besides the armed insurgents, the Tatmadaw must contend with anti-government forces in the areas it controls, as demonstrated by the assassination of one of the junta's loyalists in Yangon in May. A recent study estimated the Tatmadaw's strength at around 150,000, including 70,000 in combat units. These figures can be put into context against the historical backdrop of US troop deployments to Vietnam, which totalled almost half a million at the height of the Vietnam War. While the two conflicts are not absolute historical comparisons, they do illustrate the scale of the challenge facing the junta. Considering that Myanmar is geographically larger than Vietnam and scattered with thick jungles and mountains, the Tatmadaw is struggling against a simultaneous fight against rebel forces throughout the country.
