The first half of 2023 in the Middle East and North Africa was characterised by relative peace and stability, the conflict in Yemen for the most part had subsided, conflict between Israel and Hamas was comparatively calm, and longstanding wars, such as those in Syria and Iraq, which had plagued the region, remained at a low intensity. This rapidly changed following Hamas’ unprecedented offensive into Israel on 7 October, afflicting the region with the violent overspill of the conflict. A surge in airstrikes, anti-government protests, and sectarian conflict, coupled with regional unrest linked to the conflict in Gaza, have underscored the overarching challenges shaping the region at the end of 2023 and will remain the driving factors behind instability throughout 2024.
MENA overall security risk ratings
Source: SCR Risk Intelligence Platform
On the morning of 7 October, more than 2,000 militants from Palestinian Sunni Islamist militant group, Hamas, breached the border from the Gaza Strip into Israel, through approximately 29 openings in the barrier. What ensued was a series of co-ordinated attacks across Israel over two days, with Hamas pillaging kibbutzs in the south, murdering, raping and maiming civilians, whilst firing approximately 2,200 rockets towards southern and central Israel, including against Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Approximately 1,200 Israelis, 70% of those civilians, were killed during Hamas’ unprecedented attack, with an additional 240 Israeli citizens taken as hostages. It took the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) three days to recapture the ground Hamas had taken. The IDF responded with its own offensive into Gaza on 27 October, entering from the north and north-east, and marching towards the Mediterranean Sea on the western coast, splitting the enclave to the north and south. As it stands, Israel has captured Gaza City to the north and is on the precipice of capturing Khan Yunis to the south.
Territorial expansion was not the goal of Hamas’ offensive into Israel, rather, it wanted to, and succeeded in, showcasing to Israel, the Middle East, and the rest of the world, that it stood as a legitimate regional threat and possessed the capabilities to contest Israel’s sovereignty.
In the wake of the 7 October attacks, many questions have been asked as to why Hamas decided to launch the deadliest and largest attack in its 36 years of conflict with Israel, and how did the attacks manage to fall under the radar of the world’s most sophisticated and active intelligence agencies, in the Mossad and Shin Bet. Whilst many of these questions are yet to be answered, what can be deduced from preliminary analysis is that a blend of regional upheaval, and a preoccupation with internal affairs, created the perfect environment for Hamas to launch its lightning offensive.
In late 2020, the US helped broker an agreement between the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan to help normalise diplomatic relations with Israel, through a series of bilateral agreements. The agreement was seen as a historic milestone for Israeli relationships in the region, which for the most part, had been characterised by its omission from diplomatic ties with its Arab neighbours, following the partition of Palestine and the gaining of its independence in 1948. The agreement fostered greater opportunity for financial and security cooperation in the region, particularly between Israel, the UAE and Bahrain, who shared a common view on the regional threat posed by Iran. Whilst the agreement was orchestrated in the hopes of fostering regional peace, from the outset, signs emerged that the promotion of Israeli diplomatic ties in the region had the potential to exacerbate pre-existing hostilities.
On 19 October 2020, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the United States Department of Homeland Security disseminated an intelligence assessment to other US government agencies warning of the potential ramifications of the Abraham Accords. It asserted that the failure of the agreement to address the concerns of the Palestinian people, coupled with Iranian allegations that the UAE and Bahrain had “betrayed the Palestinian people”, increased the likelihood of violence. Additionally, it noted that terrorist organisations had a history of orchestrating attacks years after catalyst events. For the Palestinian people, the Abraham Accords did not represent a means for regional peace, rather, it symbolised a changing tide in the region, one in which their historical allies would no longer hear their voices over the desire for greater economic cooperation. Additionally, for Iran, the signing of the Abraham Accords exemplified the growing influence of its greatest adversary, the US, in the region. To curtail the growing US influence, and to reinstate the voice of the Palestinian people in the Middle East, the likelihood of an event of unprecedented scale increased markedly.
Prior to the attacks of 7 October, Israel’s year had been marred by unprecedented social unrest over the parliament’s proposed judicial reforms, redacting the Supreme Court of Israel’s level of governmental oversight. Of particular concern, was the proposal to remove the Supreme Court’s ability to evaluate, and if need be, veto, government policies if it failed to pass the “reasonableness doctrine”. For many Israeli citizens, the decision was seen as anti-democratic, and an attempted power grab by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to help avoid prosecution for corruption. If passed, the judicial reform would have granted Israel’s parliament with levels of autonomy, and limited oversight, not yet seen before.
In response to the proposed judicial reform, tens of thousands of Israelis took to the streets each week, since January 2023, in protest of the perceived power grab. The protests were polarising, splitting the country’s ruling far-right government from the majority of the population, with more than 66% of the population opposing the reforms. The intense and sustained social unrest consumed Israel’s psyche for much of 2023, with polling indicating that approximately 45% of the population believed the country was on the brink of a civil war. Comforted by the fact that Hamas was consumed with the task of governing the Gaza Strip, an enclave of more than two million inhabitants, and that Israel enjoyed a vast advantage in its military capability, many Israelis felt safe to turn their gaze inwards towards internal affairs. However, whilst much of Israel’s attention was turned inward, its greatest adversaries, Hamas and Iran, were focused on asserting themselves further beyond their national borders.
Cases of unrest in Israel in 2023
Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED)
Egypt’s three stage plan
In late December, Egypt, a key mediator in the conflict, announced that it had devised a “three-step ceasefire plan” to resolve the conflict in Gaza, which included regular humanitarian ceasefires, a staggered release of hostages held by Hamas in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, and finally, a complete ceasefire. The proposal also included a pathway for the resurrection of a Palestinian government, comprised of technocrats to govern Gaza following a resolution to the conflict. The proposed plan was welcomed to an extent by both parties, however, remains a highly unlikely path to resolution in the conflict.
Whilst in the past Egypt has been successful at mediating between the two conflicting parties, as seen in its successful negotiation of the release of 80 Israeli hostages in return for 240 Palestinian prisoners in November, Israel has remained steadfast in its assertion that the conflict will not end until Hamas is fully eradicated, and all hostages are released. Instead, it is likely Israel will reject Egypt’s proposal, in favour of continuing, and potentially escalating, its operations in Gaza.
Total eradication of Hamas
In response to global efforts by the United Nations to impose a humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza, Netanyahu announced on 25 December that the war was far from over, and that the release of the remaining 132 Israeli hostages would not be possible without sustained military pressure. Additionally, the chief of the IDF, Herzi Halevi, declared that the war would continue for many more months to ensure the preservation of Israel’s efforts in Gaza, highlighting that there was no substitution for persistent fighting in dismantling Hamas.
The conflict in Gaza will likely continue well into 2024, as Israel continues its success in gaining territory in Gaza and dismantling Hamas. Following Israel’s likely success in the region, it is highly unlikely it will relinquish control of Gaza to a newly resurrected Palestinian government. Instead, Israel will maintain a strong presence in the region for the foreseeable future, acting alongside a newly installed Palestinian government, ensuring any remnants of Hamas, or newly emerging radical groups, do not spread.
The loss of United States’ support
However, as international condemnation over Israel’s tactics in Gaza grows, and the ramifications of the conflict continue to spill over the border into its Arab neighbours and further afield, Israel risks the possibility of losing the backing of its greatest ally, the US. As the war enters its fourth month, there is a growing divide between the US’ perspectives on the war and Israel’s tactics. The US has recently begun to lobby Israel to install temporary humanitarian ceasefires in Gaza, on top of growing calls from Democratic lawmakers to stop providing Israel with financial aid, citing the financial burden on a system which is already strained by its support of Ukraine in its ongoing conflict with Russia.
Compounding the burgeoning division between the US and Israel, is the proliferation of attacks by pro-Iranian militant groups against US forces in Iraq and Syria, and the bombing of merchant vessels in the Red Sea by the Iranian-backed, Yemeni militant group the Houthis, in support of Hamas’ operations. As the US enters an election year, US President Joe Biden will be prioritising, and looking to, garner public support. As such, the strength of Biden’s support will be called into question in the face of a growing global social movement condemning Israel’s operations in Gaza. Whilst it remains unlikely, the prospect of losing the backing of the US may place Israel in a position to explore a premature ceasefire.
For much of 2023, Yemen enjoyed a modicum of peace and stability compared to the previous eight years of war which broke out in 2014 between the internationally recognised Yemeni government, supported by a Saudi Arabian-led coalition, and Iranian-backed Houthis. Since the outbreak of the war, more than 377,000 Yemeni civilians have died. Following an end to the UN-brokered six months truce in October 2022, both sides, for the most part, refrained from re-engaging in conflict, affording Yemen a period of relative calm. Compounding the growing hopes of stability in the region, was the adoption of several peace talks between Saudi Arabian, Iranian and Houthi officials in Oman, China, and Saudi Arabia during 2023. The ongoing effectiveness of the expired UN-truce, and the success of peace talks, led UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, Hans Grundberg, to declare in April 2023 that Yemen was experiencing the longest period of relative peace since 2014.
However, despite relative internal stability between the Houthis and the Saudi Arabian-led coalition, aerial attacks perpetrated by Houthi forces have intensified in the latter half of the year, following Israel’s incursion into Gaza on 27 October. In support of Hamas’ operations, the Houthis have conducted frequent aerial bombardments on international merchant shipping vessels in the Red Sea, originally justified as a means to disrupt Israel’s operations in Gaza, by targeting Israeli-owned and Israel bound ships. However, it has become apparent that of the 24 merchant shipping vessels targeted by Houthi forces between 19 November and 2 January, many do not have any affiliation with Israel.
The proliferation of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea has drawn in global support into the region, culminating in the formation of Operation Prosperity Guardian on 18 December, a US-led, multinational coalition designed to provide protective services to merchant shipping vessels transiting the Red Sea and its surrounding waters. Following sustained attacks, the US-led coalition issued its final warning to the Houthis on 3 January, to cease their operations or risk further counter measures.
This warning, however, has for the most part, been ignored by the Houthis, who have continued their drone and missiles strikes, significantly increasing the probability that US-led coalition forces will conduct aerial strikes on Houthi forces during 2024. The coalition’s 13 member countries have all announced their preparedness to initiate counter measures, with key naval vessels having been moved into place in anticipation of military escalation. The path this escalation takes will, however, depend on whether the Houthis reduce the scope of their activities or ramp them up in response.
Whilst the US and their allies are capable of targeting Houthis with relative impunity, the Houthis have previously proven to be resilient in the face of a technologically superior foe during its fight against the Saudi-led coalition. It is therefore far from certain that strikes would immediately remove the Houthis' capacity to target shipping in the region. Whether the group’s intent to continue with these attacks remains will likely depend on whether Tehran believes military action against the Houthis' represents an existential threat to the group and its military capabilities, as Tehran will almost certainly prioritise the maintenance of its strategically vital proxy force in Yemen. The most likely near-term outcome is a continuation of Houthi attacks – to demonstrate that their ability to be a regional disruptor remains – although the frequency of these attacks is likely to then reduce due to the impact of coalition strikes on their military capacity and shifts in tactics employed to preserve their military assets in the face of these strikes. The US and their allies will most likely, therefore, be drawn into a tit-for-tat conflict, the intensity of which will be kept below escalation thresholds. There is a credible risk of escalation, however. The Houthis are militarily capable and if this capability remains intact, it presents them with numerous options, including attacking Saudi Arabia and increasing threats to shipping, which would intensify the conflict.
Whatever the ultimate trajectory of the conflict with the Houthis, the engagement of US-led forces against an additional Iranian-backed militant group will further deteriorate relations between the US and Iran, which have already been strained from other ongoing conflicts in the region, potentially resulting in further violent blowback for the US and its allies.
The past year has witnessed a discernible re-amplification of Iranian influence throughout the Middle East, notably intensifying in recent months, concurrent with the initiation of the Gaza conflict. The bolder actions of Iranian-backed terrorist and militant groups in the region, particularly the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI), Houthis, and Hezbollah, in support of Palestine, underscore Tehran’s far-reaching influence across the region. Simultaneously, the influence of Western powers, notably the US, has diminished over the reporting period.
The substantial alignment of candidates with Iranian interests in Iraq’s recent general elections on 18 December, coupled with Tehran's considerable support and subsequent influence over both Prime Minister Mohamed Shia al-Sudani and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), raises pertinent concerns about potential heightened political destabilisation in Iraq.
Relations between Iraq and the US have grown increasingly strained over recent months due to heightened hostilities between the US and Iranian-backed militant groups in the area, particularly the IRI. Following the US’ declaration of support for Israel in the ongoing conflict in Gaza, attacks on US-occupied bases in Syria and Iraq have increased both in intensity and frequency, prompting the US to respond. Indeed, US bases in Syria and Iraq sustained over 100 missile and drone attacks from 18 October to the end of December. Following several fatal attacks against militant bases in Baghdad in December, the Iraqi government has officially taken steps to remove the 2,500 military coalition troops from the country. The withdrawal of these troops is expected to create a vacuum that may facilitate the increased presence and influence of militant and terrorist groups within the country.
The augmentation of Iran's influence across multiple nations positions it in a strengthened regional context. However, Iran is confronted with the challenge of preserving this advantage without eliciting military responses from foreign actors.
Iraq continues to grapple with the presence of multiple Iranian-backed militant groups, whose attacks have intensified since October of this year. The IRI has been conducting almost daily drone strikes against airbases in Erbil and Baghdad, with a primary focus on US and coalition forces in the country. The groups' targeting of the US Embassy and the International Green Zone in Baghdad on 8 December heightened international tensions, leading to a subsequent increase in the frequency and intensity of US attacks on militant hideouts, both in Baghdad and rural areas.
Violent attacks recorded in Iraq during 2023
Source: ACLED
Turkey has persisted in its targeting of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq and Syria for another year, conducting almost daily airstrikes and military manoeuvres. In late December, Turkey’s National Defence Ministry announced that an estimated 2,120 PKK militants had been "neutralised" in 2023, contributing to the decades-long body count. Significantly, 2023 witnessed an increase in Iraqi and Syrian civilian casualties resulting from the fallout of Turkish strikes in Kurdish-occupied areas, further destabilising increasingly impoverished and insecure rural regions.
While the Syrian civil war ceasefire established in March 2020 has continued into another year, the presence of multiple and often opposed armed factions continues to result in a complex security environment. This includes Islamic groups with ties to al-Qaeda, dormant Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS) cells, anti-regime groups backed by Turkey, and US-supported Kurdish-led fighters. The unclaimed drone attack on a military academy in western Syria on 5 October, resulting in over 100 casualties and numerous injuries, highlights the persistent risk of attacks throughout the nation.
The activities of these groups also contributed towards a surge in reported kidnappings in the second half to 2023 that can be attributed to the increasing use of abductions to achieve political and military goals. Armed groups vying for territorial control, have frequently targeted civilians and rival militants. Turkish-backed militant groups have routinely targeted Syrian migrants attempting to cross the Turkish border, often demanding ransoms from their families for their release.
Syria’s north and western border regions continue to be plagued by airstrikes conducted by both US and Turkish forces, following the escalation of attacks by Iranian-backed groups since 20 October. These strikes are now occurring almost daily. Concurrently to the commencement of the conflict in Gaza in October, Israel increased their missile strikes on Syrian territory to counter alleged growing Hezbollah cells. Whilst these attacks have previously occurred infrequently along their shared border, multiple missiles have hit Damascus and other major cities over recent months, raising concerns about the potential spread of conflict in the Middle East.
Anti-Assad protests and strikes, initiated on 17 August in Sweida, in the southwest of Syria, are expected to persist into 2024, fuelled by ongoing opposition to President Bashar al-Assad, national economic challenges, and issues of violence and sectarianism. The movement has evolved into a more explicit anti-government stance, with protests occurring almost weekly throughout the south. Law enforcement's use of violence in response to protests have only further fuelled anti-government sentiment.
The Middle East and North Africa are undergoing one of the worst humanitarian crises across the globe, exacerbated by the onset of the conflict in Gaza. In the Middle East alone, in 2024 the UN expects approximately 15.8 million civilians will become displaced persons. The Syrian crisis is expected to remain the largest cause for displacement, with over 5.3 million registered Syrian refugees in 2024. North African countries will continue to experience waves of refugee movements as more people flee poor conditions in Sahelian countries under military junta leaderships.
The impact of refugee movement on regional security manifests through three key dynamics. In rural areas along national borders, where militant and terrorist cells strategically position themselves to evade security forces, the substantial movement of displaced persons significantly escalates the risk of unintended civilian casualties during military operations targeting these groups. Concurrently, as humanitarian organisations, including the UN, transport vital supplies and vehicles to provide assistance in these vulnerable zones, militant groups view these assets as lucrative targets, contributing to the perpetuation of violence when these resources are seized. Additionally, refugees, driven by the imperative need for sustenance and shelter, may be more inclined to collaborate with these groups for survival. Effective mitigation of large refugee movements and the reinforcement of military presence along border regions necessitate a strategic allocation of enhanced resources.
