Europe’s security landscape in 2023 continued to be overshadowed by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, in addition to political and economic uncertainty fuelling civil unrest in the vast majority of European countries. Active assailant incidents represented the most notable increase, with 10 recorded incidents and significantly more casualties compared to 2022. The Israel-Hamas conflict acted as a flashpoint for Islamist extremism in Europe, predominantly in France and Belgium, showcasing the impact of regional conflicts on Europe’s security.
A diverse security landscape will persist in 2024, likely to be dominated by a protracted inter-state conflict in Ukraine and rising political violence risks stemming from an uncertain economic recovery and Europe's increasingly fractured political sphere. These factors will also contribute towards a fertile breeding ground for various forms of extremism, increasing the likelihood of terror-related incidents.
Acts of violence directed against European officials surged in 2024, symbolic of an increasingly fraught political landscape affected by ongoing inter-state conflict, geo-political uncertainty, polarization, and societal discontent.
The attempted assassination of Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico in May served as a stark example of how violence has increasingly become an outlet for political grievances, with further events supporting this assertion. In France, a government spokesperson’s campaign team were physically assaulted in Paris. In total, 51 French candidates and campaigners were verbally and/or physically attacked during July’s election period. In Spain, the King and Prime Minister were pelted with mud by mobs unhappy with the response to devastating floods in November. In the U.K., Nigel Farage had a drink thrown at him during campaigning. In Georgia, an opposition politician was beaten unconscious by police during protests in Tbilisi. In Denmark, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen was assaulted in Copenhagen suffering minor injuries. And in Ireland, a counselor and her husband were violently assaulted while putting up pro-immigration posters in Dublin.
Germany, where mainly Green Party officials were targeted in a series of brazen physical assaults, was the regional hotspot. Notably, some of the incidents occurred on commercial premises, including supermarkets and restaurants, highlighting the possible business implications from reputational damage and loss of earnings. Political violence has steadily increased since 2019 with data indicating a progressive shift from right-wing to left-wing targets, from the AfD to the Green party. This shift is attributed to the Green party’s recent success which led to it gaining temporary control of Germany’s political center – rendering it a prominent target.
Figure 1: Violent incidents against political entities in Germany (2019-2023)
Source: German Goverment
The increasingly aggressive political discourse – particularly among figures at opposing ends of the political spectrum – contributed to the normalization of violence against political opponents. Violence is driven by cumulative radicalization, where attacks by one side emboldens the opposition to retaliate. The growing radicalization and division within movements, the widespread use of violent language, and the potential decline of institutions all contribute to overall political volatility in Europe. Meanwhile, attacks and plots by terrorist groups have served as a reminder that the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism has not dissipated.
Despite a slight decline in civil unrest in 2024, certain movements were responsible for considerable levels of disruption. Farmer-led protests over the EU’s environmental regulations and rising agricultural costs caused varying degrees of disorder across much of Europe. Road blockades were formed in strategic areas including border crossings, highways, ports, and town centers. Protesters also vandalized and looted trucks importing foreign produce. The movement was capitalized on by Eurosceptic politicians and parties.
Climate activists also mounted protests disrupting travel infrastructure. Notably in August, climate activists coordinated to disrupt four German airports, by glueing themselves to the ground and causing hours of suspended flights at two sites. Airports in Finland, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, were all targeted by climate protesters during 2024. Companies accused of damaging the environment have also been targeted, such as Tesla, whose German “Gigafactory” was stormed by protesters and had production disrupted by an arson attack on local energy infrastructure.
The pro-Palestine movement maintained its tempo in 2024 as the Hamas-Israel conflict escalated with Israel’s ground invasion of southern Lebanon. Whilst generally peaceful, the movement has increasingly served as a platform to amplify themes concerning foreign military aid, immigration, anti-Islamic sentiment, and antisemitism. Political groups across the spectrum have exploited the movement to advance their own agendas and reinforce divisive rhetoric – further contributing to political friction in Europe.
Union-led strikes and demonstrations accounted for most of the civil unrest in Europe in 2024, causing significant business disruption, particularly public transport, including (but not limited to) French air traffic controller strikes, Lufthansa strikes, and the EasyJet staff strike.
Figure 2: European countries most impacted by civil unrest (2023-2024)
Source: ACLED
In Georgia, pro-EU demonstrations became increasingly violent as democratic processes were seemingly undermined with allegations of vote rigging giving the pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream party more than 54% of votes – ending hopes of Georgia joining the EU anytime soon. Protests in Tbilisi routinely ended with violent clashes between police and protesters. Unrest in the U.K. following the Southport stabbing attack highlighted how disinformation spread on social media can fuel violence. Far-right groups exploited the incident, with protests developing to include anti-immigration and anti-Islam narratives, leading to hotels and places of worship being targeted.
Europe experienced a surge in anti-tourism protests in 2024. Growing resentment amongst locals in tourist destinations concerning the lack of housing and adequate infrastructure culminated in a series of protests primarily occurring in Spain, with some foreign travelers in Barcelona being directly targeted.
Germany: Magdeburg Christmas market attack. An Iranian refugee with strong Islamophobic views drove a vehicle into a group of people attending a Christmas market, killing six and injuring over 200.
Germany: Solingen mass stabbing attack. A Syrian national and self-proclaimed IS-KP terrorist targeted a traditional festival in a mass stabbing attack, killing three and injuring eight others.
Austria: IS-KP terrorism plot against Taylor Swift concert foiled. A multi-security agency coordinated effort helped thwart a likely mass-casualty terrorist attack at a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna, Austria.
Turkey: PKK attack in Ankara against defense organization. Two Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorists targeted the Turkish Aerospace Industries headquarters in Ankara, killing five and injuring 22 others.
United Kingdom: Southport mass stabbing attack. A suspect killed three children and injured 10 others in a mass-stabbing incident at a Taylor Swift themed dance workshop in Southport.
Germany: Manheim mass stabbing attack. A suspect killed one police officer and injured six other people after targeting an anti-Islam rally.
Slovakia: Attempted assassination of Robert Fico. Slovakian Prime Minister was wounded in a shooting by a suspect opposed to his stance on military aid for Ukraine.
Russia: IS-KP Crocus City Hall terrorist attack. Four terrorists targeted an event at the hall in northern Moscow, killing over 145 people.
France: Terror plot targeting the Olympics in Saint-Etienne foiled. French police arrested a suspect planning a terrorist attack against stadium.
Denmark: Two explosions around the Israeli embassy in Copenhagen. Two hand grenades were thrown at the embassy, exploding 100m from the building. Three suspects were arrested.
Sweden: Israeli embassy targeted in shooting in Stockholm.
France: Farmer-led protests vandalize and loot foreign food trucks. Protesters targeted food imports in southern Drome.
Spain: Protests in Valencia over government response to the floods. Over 100,000 people attended protests in Valencia, though others were reported in major urban centers across Spain.
Georgia: Significant levels of anti-government civil unrest in Tbilisi. Hundreds of pro-democracy protesters detained.
Russia: Suspected air-defense downing of Azerbaijan Airlines 8243. Alleged proximal Ukrainian drone activity resulted in the accidental targeting of a commercial aircraft by Russian air-defense near Grozny.
Figure 3: Most prevalent risks by country in 2024
Source: Alert:24
Islamist extremism continued to act as the primary terror-related risk to European security in 2024. Established groups like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) retained the highest levels of intent and capability to conduct sophisticated mass-casualty attacks, such as the Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, Russia. The attack saw four IS-K terrorists kill 145 people using firearms and improvised explosive devices. The group was likely demonstrating its ability to strike targets beyond its traditional area of operations in the APAC region. Lone-wolf attacks inspired by Islamist extremist ideologies and using low-sophistication means also remained a persistent threat. For instance, mass-stabbing incidents like the Solingen attack in Germany, using knives and targeting public events remain the primary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used by lone-wolf actors. However, in Austria authorities foiled a late-stage and likely mass-casualty terrorist attack in Vienna targeting a music concert. The suspects had links to IS-K and acquired chemical explosives and detonators. A blue emergency service light was also recovered and would have facilitated entry / exit to high-footfall areas around the venue. The incident not only displayed the overarching threat posed by IS-K – due to their clear intent, capabilities, and the likely significant loss of life the attack would of resulted in – but it also highlighted the financial losses attributed to cancelled events due to significant security risks. Further on the targeting of large events, three terror plots against the Paris Olympics were thwarted by authorities.
The vehicle-ramming attack targeting a Christmas market in Magdeburg, Germany – deploying another, common, low-sophistication TTP – served as a reminder that terrorist attacks can be influenced by a plethora of complex motives. The suspect, a Saudi national with strong anti-Islamic views and disdain for Germany’s treatment of Saudi refugees did not fit any existing threat profiles, highlighting the difficulties faced by security mechanisms in identifying and preventing attacks.
Beyond Islamist extremism, the threat of extreme right- and left-wing inspired terrorism also remained a constant in 2024. In November, German authorities arrested eight extreme right-wing individuals belonging to Saechsische Separatisten (Saxon Separatists) who were training for warfare and planned to seize control of certain areas of eastern Germany in the self-proclaimed imminent collapse of German society. Armed separatist groups were identified as the single largest contributor to left-wing inspired terrorism in Europe. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) attack in Ankara, Turkey against the headquarters of state-owned Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAS) killed five and injured 22 others. The incident signaled the PKK’s focus on critical defense projects enabling Turkey’s ongoing counter-terrorism operations against the PKK in northern Iraq.
As geopolitical tensions escalate, state-sponsored aggression is becoming more commonplace in Europe, potentially influencing the political violence market. The U.K.’s security service, MI5, warned in December that the resurgence of Islamic State coupled with state-sponsored aggression from Russia, Iran, and China provide a significant security challenge. Russia’s sustained use of hybrid warfare, also known as Grey Zone Warfare (GZW), continued to undermine European security. Russia was linked to the sabotage of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea vital to European telecommunications, the use of incendiary devices on cargo planes, GPS jamming impacting commercial aviation, cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and has long been linked to interference in European politics. Iran meanwhile reportedly leveraged organized crime groups (OCGs) in Europe to carry out attacks against Iran’s opponents, including attempted attacks against Israeli embassies in Sweden and Denmark. MI5 stated that it had prevented 20 Iranian-backed plots in the U.K. since 2022, including using OCGs to conduct hostile reconnaissance against Jewish targets as part of a planned assassination campaign.
On battlefield developments, Russian advances in eastern Ukraine in 2024 resulted in the occupation of over 4,000 square kilometers, most being limited in strategic value and at a cost of over 420,000 casualties. Notably, over half of Russia’s gains were made in three months (September - November). Russia concentrated most of its efforts in Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblast. Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk Oblast in August was seen as an attempt to degrade Russia’s ability to launch cross-border airstrikes in the Donetsk area, though it also challenged the Kremlin’s control of the conflict's information space.
Russia amended its nuclear doctrine in response to the West’s approval for Ukraine to deploy long-ranged weapons against Russian territory. The amendment includes retaliation for both nuclear attacks and conventional strikes that threaten it or Belarus.
North Korea’s deployment of at least 10,000 soldiers to the battlefield signaled a further escalation of the conflict. Russia’s reliance on allies including North Korea, China, and Iran have provided it the necessary means to maintain battlefield tempo in the face of mounting financial strain.
The downing of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 in Kazakhstan by suspected Russian air-defense systems positioned in the North Caucasus highlighted the continued risks faced by commercial aviation operating in flight regions adjacent to conflict zones.
Kidnap for ransom cases were less widespread across the region in Q4. Russia remained the region’s kidnap for ransom hotspot, accounting for 62.5% of reported cases. Spain continues to record sporadic cases despite police repeatedly demonstrating their capability at investigating cases, rescuing victims, and arresting suspects. One case involved an unsuccessful ‘express kidnapping’ when a man was briefly held by a group of unidentified assailants in the capital Madrid. The assailants stole the victim’s belongings and unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw money from an ATM before returning his items and fleeing. In the second case, a man was kidnapped during a test drive of a vehicle he intended to purchase near Seville. The assailants demanded €8,000 from him for his release. A police patrol detected suspicious activity, intercepted the car, and rescued the victim. While the kidnappers fled the scene, police later arrested two suspects and continued to search for a third. The risk will remain slightly higher in Spain than in the rest of Europe, a region which will continue to report a very low incidence of kidnap for ransom in Q1 2025.
Europe will almost certainly experience a turbulent 2025. Uncertainties stemming from regional conflicts, chiefly in Ukraine but also the Israel-Hamas conflict, will likely dictate a focus on security. A divisive Trump administration may force Europe to strike a complex balancing act between navigating an uncertain policy-making period over trade, the Ukraine conflict, and international relations, without sacrificing strategic interests and unity in the face of rising global tensions.
The possibility of Trump fully leveraging the U.S.’ power to put an end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict – with Ukraine likely being compelled to concede parts of its occupied territory – could galvanize Russia to ramp up its hostile activities against Europe using its vast array of GZW tactics. This alone could lead to considerable levels of commercial disruption in sectors perceived to enable Western aggression against Russia. Despite its intent remaining high, Russia’s military capability and war economy are assessed as significantly degraded, making the likelihood of a direct Russian attack against Europe in 2025 highly unlikely – supporting the assessment concerning its increasing application of GZW tactics.
A possible return of Trump’s hostility towards Iran coupled with Europe’s increasing opposition to Iran’s transnational repression of political opponents could jeopardize Iran’s nuclear ambitions – having recently displayed a willingness to engage in negotiations for its expansion. In retaliation, Iran could ramp up its undermining of European security, be it in the form of increased material support for Russia’s frontline operations in Ukraine, or an escalation of its existing hostile operations in Europe.
On civil unrest, sustained political friction brought on by socio-political and economic factors alongside rising populism will almost certainly continue to drive civil unrest in 2025 – particularly in Germany where federal elections in February will likely act as a flashpoint for political violence. Despite a slight lull in farmer-led protests in the latter half of 2024, anticipated EU focus on climate control policies in 2025 may also act as a flashpoint and could lead to a resurgence of disruptive farmer-led protests in Europe. The trend of elevated levels of violence against political targets is anticipated to continue in 2025, driven by growing radicalization as political volatility remains. An uncertain European economic outlook driven by geopolitical tensions is expected to spur strikes and work stoppages leading to commercial disruption, particularly in service industries. In Georgia, pro-democracy and EU demonstrations will likely continue, though will likely dissipate as the Georgian Dream party consolidates its power.
Terrorism trends in 2025 will highly likely continue to stem from lone-wolf actors inspired by radical Islamic ideology and involve low-sophistication TTPs. Targeting will almost certainly be focused on large events, though symbolic targets associated to figures, industries, or institutions with links to socio-political or religious grievances cannot be ruled out. Established terrorist groups such as IS-K will likely seek to expand on recent high-profile attacks, using them to drive recruitment in Europe which could be supplemented further by the ongoing instability in the Middle East. Mounting political friction driving cumulative radicalization in Europe will highly likely act as a flashpoint for a surge in extreme right / left-wing inspired terrorism. The fall of the Assad regime in Syria is assessed as unlikely to have a significant and direct impact on European security, with disaffected hardline groups likely to splinter within Syria and focus operations within the county to undermine Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s newfound rule. However, the treatment of Syrian refugees in Europe could act as a catalyst for lone-actor-type attacks in Europe.
