In 2024, the Latin America (LATAM) region continued to face significant challenges related to kidnapping, organized crime, and political violence. Kidnapping, including for ransom and express types, was a persistent threat in Mexico and Brazil, where criminal groups target both locals and foreigners. Regarding organized crime dynamics, Mexican cartels continued to expand operations into countries such as Guatemala, Honduras, and Ecuador, exacerbating local rates of violent crime related to drug trafficking, extortion, and other illicit activities. In Colombia, remnants of guerrilla and paramilitary groups continue to destabilize the region, while Brazil struggles with gang-controlled neighborhoods fueling armed violence in urban areas. Political violence was most severe in Ecuador, where multiple assassinations of municipal officials perpetrated by criminal gangs occurred in 2024, and in Mexico, assassinations of political candidates during the 2024 elections hit an all-time high. These interconnected issues highlight the evolving and complex security landscape across LATAM in 2024.
Figure 1: Kidnap victim profile in Latin America in Q4 by percentage
Source: Alert 24/AKE
Kidnap for ransom remains a widespread issue across LATAM, with at least 13 countries in the region reporting cases in Q4 2024. However, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador remained regional hotspots, together accounting for 93% of the region’s recorded incidents. The total number of kidnap for ransom cases recorded across LATAM dropped by nearly 10% compared to Q3. The downtick was caused by a decline in cases in Colombia and Ecuador which recorded 27% and 58% fewer incidents, respectively, compared to the previous quarter. However, when contrasted to the same period last year the difference is marginal, with reported cases in Q4 2023 being less than 0.5% fewer than in Q4 2024.
Most kidnap incidents targeted local nationals, with only 7% of kidnap victims in Q4 2024 reported to be foreign – a slightly lower percentage compared to the same period in 2023 in which 11% of victims were not local nationals. Whilst civilians were reported as the most victimized profile group across LATAM, accounting for 77% of victims, the region reported the second highest proportion of kidnap victims with a ‘commercial’ background (12%), slightly higher than the global average (10%). In fact, all recorded victims with a ‘commercial’ background in LATAM were reported as being local nationals, and this is primarily attributed to the disproportionate impact by small gangs (banditry) and larger organized crime groups who have long engaged in extortion, threat, and kidnap of owners of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) typically owned/operated by locals (see figure 1).
Indeed, whilst most (44%) kidnap perpetrators were reported as unidentified, they are most likely to be criminally affiliated, due to the low number of terrorist or political groups that are known to engage in the practice in LATAM. In fact, the few reported kidnap incidents (4%) conducted by perpetrators with a ‘terrorism’ background were all recorded inside Colombia where left-wing militant groups continue to engage in the practice primarily for revenue generating purposes as well as negotiating power in on-again off-again peace negotiations with the Colombian government (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Kidnap perpetrator / motivation in Latin America in Q4 by percentage
Despite the low number of terrorism-related kidnaps for ransom, which have historically been some of the most dangerous and least survivable cases, the extreme violence and impunity associated with Latin American gangs and crime groups is likely to blame for the region having the highest proportion of victims killed (14%) whilst being held hostage (see figure 3) – well above the global average (8%). Certainly, the overall kidnap for ransom risk will remain high across the region; nevertheless, efforts by the Gustavo Petro government in Colombia to see the country’s long-term internal conflicts with a host of militant political groups come to a negotiated peace, in tandem with Ecuador’s ongoing crackdown on narco gangs aimed at degrading their presence following an alarming rise in kidnap and extortion rates in recent years, may lead to some improvements. However both countries have so far struggled to achieve these goals.
Figure 3: Kidnap outcomes in Latin America in Q4 by percentage
Figure 4: Most prevalent risks by country in 2024
Source: Alert:24
Argentina: In December 2023, Javier Milei, an ultra-libertarian, took office as Argentina's president, signaling a shift in the country's domestic economic policies and international relations.
Bolivia: In June 2024, a faction of dissident military officers attempted a coup in La Paz against President Luis Arce, citing governance issues. The coup was quickly suppressed, highlighting Bolivia’s fragile political stability.
Brazil: According to Brazilian Federal Police reporting, organized crime groups like the Red Command (CV) and the First Capital Command (PCC) expanded into one-third of Brazil's municipalities in 2024, intensifying the country's security challenges.
Ecuador: In January 2024, President Daniel Noboa declared an "internal armed conflict" against 22 criminal gangs, escalating security operations with multiple localized state-of-emergency extensions, primarily concentrated in coastal provinces.
El Salvador: El Salvador reported a record low of 114 homicides in 2024, a major achievement under President Nayib Bukele’s "state of exception," which resulted in over 83,000 arrests despite concerns over civil rights.
Haiti: In early 2024, Multinational Security Support (MSS) forces, led by Kenyan police, were deployed to Port-au-Prince to combat gang violence, with the Viv Ansanm coalition controlling 80% of the capital.
Mexico: In the 2024 elections, political violence surged, with over 100 candidates targeted. Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico's first female president, was elected, and the MORENA party-maintained control of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate.
Panama: Panama deployed troops and barriers in 2024 to curb migrant flows through the Darién Gap under President José Raúl Mulino. Despite these efforts, over 300,000 migrants crossed the region.
Peru: In 2024, Peru declared four security-related states of emergency due to rising crime and unrest in Lima, Trujillo, Pataz, and Callao. The government's response aimed to curb violence in these regions.
Trinidad and Tobago: In December 2024, a state of emergency was declared due to escalating gang violence. Trinidad and Tobago also experience the highest murder rate on record, totaling 623 killings in 2024.
Venezuela: In August 2024, the Venezuelan Supreme Court validated President Nicolás Maduro’s re-election despite allegations of fraud and opposition suppression, deepening the political crisis and drawing international condemnation. The contested election continues to fuel internal unrest.
The year 2024 witnessed a significant escalation in the influence of organized crime and political violence across Latin America, severely undermining regional security and efficacy of governance. Criminal enterprises, notably those in Mexico, Haiti, Colombia, and Ecuador, have expanded their operational capabilities, often intertwining with political structures to advance their interests and destabilize democratic institutions. These developments have compelled governments to implement various security policies, yet their effectiveness remains insufficient in comprehensively countering the pervasive threat posed by organized crime.
In Mexico, the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) dominated the drug trafficking landscape, with 2024 seeing an unprecedented rise in politicized violence surrounding elections. The criminal organizations actively engaged in violence against political figures, exemplified by the assassination of 37 political candidates leading up to the June general elections. The electoral landscape was marked by threats and coercion as organized crime sought to exert control and ensure favorable outcomes. Reports indicated that criminals utilized violence as a tool to manipulate elections, endangering citizens' right to free and fair governance.
The security situation in Haiti was marked by the emergence of the Viv Ansanm gang alliance, which effectively seized control approximately 85% of Port-au-Prince through organized campaigns of outright aggression. Additionally, Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s resignation in April amid threats of violence from gangs, underscored the extent which organized crime has penetrated the political fabric. Under such conditions, as of 2024 an estimated 2.7 million Haitians live under gang control, facing daily violence, kidnappings, and sexual assaults, amidst a collapse of coherent state authority. The resulting humanitarian crisis has left over 700,000 internally displaced, highlighting the instability and breakdown of governance in the country. Moreover, the absence of a consistent security presence enabled attacks on public infrastructure, including international transportation hubs, as several incidents involving small arms fire targeting aircraft at Toussant Louverture International Airport (PAP/MTPP) prompted foreign governments to impose temporary bans on commercial flights to the capital on multiple occasions.
Colombia likewise experienced political violence amid the breakdown of peace negotiations with paramilitary groups. The government's 'Total Peace' initiative, championed by President Gustavo Petro, faced critical setbacks as ceasefire agreements with the National Liberation Army (ELN) and other armed factions lapsed without renewal. Armed groups, including dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), continued their attacks on political leaders, activists, and rural communities. These incidents were driven by disputes over control of drug-trafficking routes and territorial dominance in the Arauca, Cauca, Chocó, and Nariño departments.
During the period of January – December 2024, Colombia’s government recorded 278 kidnaps, which is an 11.4% drop compared to the same period in 2023 in which the state recorded 314 cases. Figure 6 shows the placement of recorded kidnaps across the country, with departments historically associated with ELN activity recording the highest figures – Antioquia (35), Cauca (33), Nariño (23), Norte de Santander (24), and Valle de Cauca (24). However, the high kidnap incidence in these regions is not specifically due to the presence of militant groups, in fact the geographic, socio-economic, and political conditions that has long allowed militants to operate in these areas have long contributed to the proliferation of other actors that engage in kidnap for ransom.
Figure 5: Security heatmap of Latin America for 2024
Source: ACLED
Figure 6: Recorded kidnaps across Colombia’s departments in 2024
Source: Colombian Ministry of Defense
In Ecuador, pervasive gang violence precipitated the country’s ongoing security crisis in 2024. The Choneros, an influential criminal organization, engaged in violent turf wars with competitors, leading to increased homicides, with rates skyrocketing from 6 to 47 per 100,000 in just a span of five years. Persistent gang violence culminated in the declaration of a state of internal armed conflict punctuated by multiple localized state of emergency extensions in response to rampant organized attacks against police and public officials. Moreso, gang perpetrated assassinations of municipal officials, particularly mayoral officers in coastal provinces, highlighted the lethal intersection of organized crime and politics in 2024.
The effectiveness of government and multilateral initiatives to address this violence has been limited. Increased deployments of security personnel to criminal hotspots in Mexico and Ecuador, while momentarily reducing homicide rates, have failed to dismantle organized crime networks or provide a sustainable long-term strategy. In Haiti, the deployment of the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), requested to assist police in restoring order, has been criticized for its inability to effectively address the continuous rise in gang violence. Furthermore, despite significant resource expenditure in combating crime and improving judicial infrastructure across the region, reports indicate rampant corruption and inefficiency hindering meaningful progress. Moreover, without addressing the root causes of crime—including poverty and lack of opportunity—these initiatives risk being fundamentally ineffectual.
When compared to 2023, 2024 has seen a marked improvement in the security situation for commercial maritime assets in the LATAM region. Per figures from the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), in 2023 there were 19 total instances of piracy-related criminality, with the Callao Anchorage in the Peruvian capital Lima alone accounting for 74% of all reports. However, across 2024 the IMB reported just two incidents; an attempted boarding of a tanker anchored at Cartagena, Colombia and a successful boarding of a container ship in Georgetown, Guyana. While there have also been reports by other outlets relating to criminal elements targeting commercial vessels in Haiti (two instances in Q2 2024 of Haitian gangs attacking rice shipments in order to secure food) and oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico (two instances in H1 2024), on the whole the data suggests an improvement in the security situation for the harbors and waterways of the LATAM region.
Continuing into 2025, kidnapping will remain the key regional security concern. The dynamics of kidnapping are expected to shift further as criminal organizations adapt their tactics to remain effective amidst heightened law enforcement scrutiny and international efforts to curb such acts. In particular, the rise of gang-related kidnappings employing sophisticated methodologies, such as “express kidnappings” utilizing digital payment platforms, is likely to increase alongside traditional forms of kidnapping, particularly in large urban centers such as Mexico City and São Paulo. This evolution reflects criminals’ attempts to exploit technological advancements and find new ways to conduct kidnap and extortion.
Transnational drug trafficking organizations, including the Sinaloa Cartel, CJNG, and Brazil’s PCC, will likely continue to expand their operational capabilities, with increasing emphasis on growing footholds outside their countries of origin. Such proliferation will likely continue to complicate regional efforts to combat organized crime, especially in countries with state institutions corroded by long term corruption. Domestically, large-scale criminal organizations will also seek to consolidate and diversify their hold on lucrative non-illicit markets within their territories where there exists a vacuum of state authority, effectively entrenching themselves deeper within local economies and politics.
Political violence, an ongoing concern throughout the region, is expected to escalate within an increasingly polarized environment by 2025. Throughout 2024, a notable rise in violent incidents targeting political figures and activists, particularly in Mexico, Ecuador, Venezuela, Honduras, and El Salvador, indicates a growing systemic challenge for governance. Incidents of assassinations, kidnappings, and social unrest related to political repression have become emblematic of broader issues underpinning weak institutions and a lack of faith in democratic processes.
The pervasive influence of organized crime on political affairs is anticipated to exacerbate these conditions. As criminal entities expand their reach into electoral processes, corruption runs the risk of undermining democratic institutions further, destabilizing elected leaders who may be beholden to powerful crime syndicates for political support. This confluence of organized crime and political tumult threatens to result in violence against dissenting voices, thereby stifling civic engagement and leading to cycles of retaliatory violence.
As governments implement harsher measures to combat organized crime, including the militarization of policing strategies, rising tensions between citizens and law enforcement will likely lead to further political unrest. The expected easing of international support for human rights initiatives amidst the ongoing global geopolitical struggles may result in diminished accountability for state actors implicated in human rights violations linked to political violence, particularly in Central American nations with long-term authoritarian regimes such as Honduras and Nicaragua. In a scenario characterized by a lack of public trust and transparency, the ascendance of authoritarian tactics may become viable as governments seek to shore up political power through force.
The Trump administration's designation of Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations via the signing of an executive order in early 2025 could trigger a complex set of ramifications domestically, in Mexico, and on the global stage. Though intended to strengthen U.S. national security, the move may strain bi-lateral relations and disrupt economic and diplomatic processes across the Americas. Whether potential gains to be made in degrading cartels warrants risking potentially significant destabilization and escalation will remain to be seen.
