2024 was a frenetic year globally, meaning significant trends and events in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) were largely relegated to the periphery, despite their far-reaching implications. Among the most notable of these developments were: the continuing civil war and humanitarian crisis in Sudan; substantial unrest in Senegal, Kenya, Nigeria, and Mozambique; escalating militant and extremist violence; and enduring conflicts in locations such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Ethiopia, Cameroon, and South Sudan.
Efforts to address many of these key issues were hindered by the limited and overstretched resources of international stakeholders, a growing desire across the region to pivot away from traditional allies toward new partners, as well as deteriorating interstate relations.
For instance, relations waned between Ethiopia and Somalia over the past year, while tensions rose significantly between the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. Perhaps most crucially, members of the newly formed Alliance for the Sahel States (AES) confirmed they will be leaving the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at the end of January 2025. A cordial departure is by no means guaranteed, raising fears over the future of regional cohesion and cooperation.
Militant groups such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the Islamic State's range of branches dispersed across the region (IS-SP, IS-M, ISWAP, ISCAP, IS-Somalia), Boko Haram (JAS), and al-Shabaab all remained significant threats in swathes of SSA.
In the Central Sahel, one the world's epicenters of terrorism, JNIM and Islamic State Sinai Province (IS-SP) control vast strips of territory, perpetrate daily acts of violence, and are increasingly threatening major urban centers. JNIM in particular has continued on an upward trajectory over the past year, conducting a spectacular attack on Bamako in September and further expanding its reach in, or along the borders with, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, and others.
Elsewhere, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and JAS remained highly active in northeastern Nigeria and the nearby Lake Chad Basin, with the former being among IS' most dominant branches globally. A relatively unheard-of Islamist group with links to the Sahel – Lakurawa – emerged in Nigeria’s northwest in November, adding yet another threat to regional security.
2024 saw Islamic State Mozambique (IS-M) launch a resurgence in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province. Similarly Islamic State Central African Province (IS-CAP) – also referred to as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) – added to the high levels of violence in the DRC's resource-rich eastern provinces, which has also been heavily impacted by conflict between the government and M23 rebels. IS has also remained a threat in Somalia, where the local branch has become integral to IS' global operations, though its violence was overshadowed by the powerful al-Shabaab, who continue to threaten vast amounts of Somalia. Among the most notable incidents involving al-Shabaab was the kidnapping of several UN workers in January, including foreign nationals, after their helicopter crash landed near Hindhere village, alongside a deadly attack on Mogadishu in August that left over 30 dead.
The haunting economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, with a full recovery for the continent not anticipated until at least 2027, combined with rising expectations from governments driven by increased education, urbanization, and social media, have been used to explain 2024’s elevated levels of insecurity.
But SSA’s rising levels of violence can also be attributed to continued interaction between long-standing social, economic, ethno-religious, and political fissures. Competition over increasingly scarce resources, such as land and water, is a growing concern for much of the region as the effects of climate change become more pronounced.
Sudan: Conflict between the SAF and RSF persisted throughout the year. Fighting was particularly intense in the tri-city capital and the Darfur region.
Senegal: Large protests erupted after former leader Macky Sall postponed a presidential vote. Bassirou Diomaye Faye was elected in late March.
Ethiopia: A deadly insurgency continued in Amhara. However, a peace deal was signed with rebels in Oromia, where kidnappings have surged.
Mali: Al-Qaeda’s West Africa branch (JNIM) attacked a military base by the Bamako’s airport and at a Gendarmerie school, killing scores in the capital.
Mozambique: Frelimo extended its decades-long hold on power following a contentious vote, which led to lengthy and disruptive protests.
DRC: Conflict between a government led coalition and M23 rebels continued in the country’s east. M23 seized several mineral-rich towns.
Somalia: Tensions rose between Somalia and Ethiopia after the latter agreed a sea access deal with the semi-autonomous Somaliland.
Burkina Faso: Between 200-600 people were killed by JNIM in Barsalogho, in what was one of Africa’s deadliest ever terrorist attacks.
Nigeria:‘End Bad Governance’ protests took place nationwide over several days in response to mounting economic difficulties.
Namibia: Ruling party SWAPO won presidential elections once again, though the vote was postponed due to poor planning.
Niger: Armed groups attacked the China-backed oil pipeline multiple times.
Chad: Boko Haram overran a military base on an island in Lake Chad, killing at least 40 people in the country’s deadliest attack in years.
Kenya: Proposed tax rises prompted weeks of large-scale protests, the government eventually withdrew the bill and reshuffled its cabinet.
South Africa: Elections saw the ruling ANC lose its parliamentary majority, leading to the formation of a coalition with the DA, the IFP, and the PA .
ECOWAS: The AES announced their departure from the bloc, after the juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger refused to restore civilian rule.
Cameroon: The bloody Anglophone crisis continued in the Northwest and Southwest regions.
Ghana: Former leader John Mahama won presidential elections.
Mali: Several western executives were detained by the junta in mining disputes
Benin: A coup plot to overthrow President Talon was reportedly foiled.
Rwanda: Talks to end fighting in eastern DRC collapsed after Rwanda withdrew. Kigali demanded that Kinshasa negotiate directly with M23.
Moreover, control over access to valuable natural resources and political power continues to fuel large-scale conflicts in the SSA. In many areas – such as Nigeria, the DRC, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Sahel – these drivers are combining with each other to fuel a complex matrix of violence.
Moreover, the continued spread of Islamist extremist groups has been powered by the manipulation of pre-existing grievances and intercommunal conflicts, often drawn along ethno-religious lines, which have allowed terrorists to firmly entrench themselves in areas historically ignored, targeted, or largely untouched by the state.
As jihadists have expanded by appealing to historically aggrieved communities, other actors – such as state forces or affiliated militias – have responded via highly ethnicized violence, exacerbating localized conflicts. There are fears that similar conditions may permit these groups to continue expanding and consolidate in new areas such as the Gulf of Guinea and other pockets of West Africa.
Figure 1: Security heatmap of Africa for 2024
Source: ACLED
Kidnap for ransom has remained a pertinent threat to those operating in the region, with the number of kidnaps recorded second only to Latin America. Trends observed in Q4 2024 suggest it is a growing risk, with the number of cases reported between October and December increasing by 52% compared to the same period of 2023. Terrorism remains the most common motivation behind incidents, while organized crime and banditry are the next most reported drivers, according to recent data.
Figure 3: Kidnap perpetrator / motivation in SSA in Q4 by percentage
Source: Alert:24/AKE
Nigeria recorded the highest rates in SSA, with Nigerian citizens reportedly paying a record NGN 2.29tn ($1.48 billon) in ransoms during 2024. South Africa also remains a notable hotspot, Ethiopia has been challenged by rising kidnapping rates, while the tri-border region spanning Chad, Cameroon, and CAR has also emerged as an area of concern. In Mali, rates have dropped dramatically in recent years, though the imprisoning of several mining executives shows a new variety of threat may be emerging in the region.
In countries such as Nigeria and Kenya, governments attempted to implement contentious fiscal decisions, leading to widespread protests. Persisting over weeks, the unrest was particularly intense and long lasting in Kenya, with demonstrators storming and setting fire to the Kenyan parliament, blocking major roadways, and taking to the streets in almost every town and city. The government eventually gave into their demands, withdrawing the controversial bill and reshuffling the cabinet.
These events are believed to have inspired similar protests in Nigeria, which despite being large-scale and disruptive, particularly in the country's north, did not reach the same levels of impact and intensity.
The year ended with Mozambique experiencing what was arguably the region’s most significant bout of unrest, prompted largely by the disputed result of October’s presidential election which saw Frelimo – a party that has been in power since the country gained independence in 1975 – claim another victory. Driven by accusations of a fraudulent result, Mozambicans protested nationwide for weeks and have continued into the new year. The unrest has had significant economic repercussions for the country, international investors, and neighboring states.
Challenges facing the region were further complicated by friction between neighboring states. In the eastern DRC, conflict between a government-led coalition of forces and the M23 group has been exacerbated by the involvement of neighboring Rwanda, who have reportedly been providing the rebel group with extensive military support. Coupled with Uganda’s alleged complicity, tensions in the Great Lakes Region have reached levels unseen since the Second Congo War. This conflict continues to impact the global supply of critical minerals and raises questions over the ambitious economic and social plans of the East African Community.
Attempts to stabilize the Somali security environment were also hampered by the ongoing disputes between the Somali federal government and Ethiopia, after Addis Ababa made a sea access deal with the semi-autonomous state of Somaliland. By the end of the year Turkey was able to mediate a resolution, though the tensions led to serious questions surrounding the long-term future of the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in the country.
Similarly, the conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – who are reportedly backed by African states such as Chad, Libya, and South Sudan – continues to engulf the country. Although the conflict has been ongoing for nearly two years and has killed over 20,000 people, an end does not seem imminent. Should violence endure, over 25 million people will remain in need of humanitarian support and millions more displaced from their homes.
But it is perhaps the ongoing dispute between the AES – composed of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger – and ECOWAS that carries the largest long-term repercussions for the region. AES confirmed in early 2024 that they will be leaving ECOWAS in late January 2025, threatening freedom of trade and movement in West Africa, as well as dashing hopes that a coordinated regional response to the spread of Islamist extremist groups may soon be formulated.
While recent indications suggest that AES’ departure may not be as impactful on the stability and cohesiveness of the region as first feared, West African relations will soon enter a new unknown era, at a time when unity and cooperation is perhaps at its most needed.
The number of reported piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea underwent a significant decrease in 2024. The 21 incidents reported in 2024 represents a 43% decrease on 2023, with almost all months seeing just one attack, and with none at all reported in September. However, pirates in the gulf retain the capability to target vessels underway, employ firearms, and kidnap crew. This was evidenced on 1 January 2024, when a tanker underway was boarded by armed pirates 45nm South of Bioko Island, Equatorial Guinea. The pirates shot at the bridge during the attack and kidnapped nine crew members who were released overnight 29-30 January.
Figure 4: MDAT GoG incidents in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) by month (2024)
Source: MDAT-GoG Reports; MDAT-GoG Incident Map
SSA remains a dynamic operational environment, one full of opportunities, but events over the past year have illustrated the broad array of security, economic, and governance challenges facing the region. Almost all of 2024’s most pertinent developments and trends are likely to persist into the new year and beyond, with many carrying the potential to worsen before they get better.
The conflict in Sudan has caused one of the worst humanitarian crises the world has seen in years, with tens of thousands dead, millions displaced, and many others facing violence and starvation. Many will be hoping that this conflict does not drastically destabilize the surrounding region in 2025. Enduring conflict here will also continue to threaten regional airspace, in a corner of the globe that has been fraught with other challenges for carriers in recent years.
Elsewhere, Ethiopia will continue to face serious challenges due to its unique societal and governmental make-up, as too will the DRC. Given the DRC’s abundance of critical minerals, enduring high levels of insecurity may increasingly be felt on the global stage. Similarly, there will be hopes Mali’s significant reconfiguration of its mining code and coercion of international operators are not mimicked elsewhere in the region.
Major economic and political players such as Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, and Kenya will hope they can better navigate the serious fiscal challenges that have been facing their societies in recent years, without prompting further civil unrest. The stability of these countries will be important for those nearby, with Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya in particular playing key leadership roles in regional counter-terrorism initiatives.
Indeed, terrorism trends were largely bleak in many of the impacted areas in 2024, indicating that next year jihadist extremist groups will likely expand further through the region. The situation appears particularly negative for the juntas in the Central Sahel, particularly in Burkina Faso and Niger. Both countries are being utilized as gateways to the Gulf of Guinea states, which are facing a crucial year in their efforts to avoid falling to the same fate.
Figure 2: Most prevalent risks by country in 2024
Source: Alert:24
MDAT GoG incidents in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) by month (2024)
