The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in 2024 experienced significant upheaval. Conflict persisted on the eastern Mediterranean, disrupting maritime trade and furthering concerns over a wider regional conflict as Iran and Israel attacked each other directly. The year culminated in regime change in Syria, a development that has manifold potential implications for the region’s political and security environment.
In contrast to the Middle East, North Africa saw relative stability, with no major conflicts or security crises. However, persistent governance challenges and socioeconomic grievances in some areas continue to pose risks of unrest or radicalization.
Broader regional trends included the continued decentralization of militant groups, an increase in asymmetric and lone-actor attacks, and the growing use of drones for reconnaissance and targeted strikes. These developments underscore the evolving strategies of non-state actors and the enduring complexities of counter-terrorism efforts across the region, which remain critical to ensuring long-term stability.
Numerous interrelated conflicts that escalated following Hamas’ assault against Israel in October 2023 continued to worsen in 2024, prompting concern that a more dangerous regional war could develop at several junctures. At the center of this was conflict between Iran and Israel, with Israel increasingly confronting Iranian proxy groups, and the two openly attacking each other on several occasions.
Israel continued its ground and aerial campaign against Hamas in Gaza, whilst concurrently launching ground operations northwards into Lebanon against Hezbollah on 1 October. Ostensibly in support of Hamas, Iranian-proxies including the Yemen-based Houthis and Hezbollah in Lebanon continued in their attempts to strike Israel and the interests of its allies in the region.
While most rocket, missile, and drone attacks against Israel were, aside from causing limited disruption to aviation and damages on the ground, largely ineffective, Houthi attacks against shipping proved more impactful, necessitating shipping companies that would usually transit the Red Sea and Suez Canal undertaking costlier voyages around the Cape of Good Hope. In total, some 83 missile and drone attacks were launched against vessels in the region, resulting in scores of vessels being damaged and two sunk, in addition to other hostile activities recorded in the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Indian Ocean Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA). Underscoring the global significance of the Houthi attacks, a report by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency stated that at least 29 major energy and shipping companies altered their routes as a result, while the interests of at least 65 countries were affected.
Figure 1: UKMTO maritime incidents in the Indian Ocean Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) by incident type (2024)
Source: United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Weekly Reports
Several key developments that went beyond the established pattern of the conflict and were seen as crossing undefined ‘red lines’ triggered escalatory cycles of attacks between Iran and Israel, as the two overtly attacked each other. Of note, Israel bombed the Iranian embassy in Syria on 1 April, prompting a response that included Iran and its proxies to target Israel with around 300 drones and ballistic missiles over 13-14 April. Israel responded directly on 19 April, striking at targets inside Iran including at the Natanz nuclear site.
Tensions between Israel and Iran remained elevated, with the assassinations of key Hamas and Hezbollah figures, including the killing of the former’s political leader whilst in Tehran in July, leading to threats of retaliation. Undeterred, Israel continued to erode Tehran’s proxies, through its sabotage of Hezbollah communication equipment with explosives. While these acts alone did not result in a direct attack on Israel by Iran, the assassination of Hezbollah’s secretary-general in Beirut, by an Israeli airstrike on 27 September, was quickly followed by a significant Iranian response. On 1 October, Iran launched its second significant attack, comprising 200 ballistic missiles, against Israel. The attack was somewhat more effective than that launched in April and, in causing two deaths and up to $53 million in damage, illustrated the potential for Iranian missiles to bypass Israel’s Iron Dome defenses. Israel responded to the attack on 25-26 October with further direct strikes on Iran, including at Tehran’s main airport, at sites in the western province of Ilam and south-western Khuzestan, and on Iranian interests in Syria. Although Iranian leaders signaled their intent to retaliate, no proportionate response was mounted, potentially an indicator of the scale of damage inflicted on Tehran’s ‘Axis-of-Resistance’ in the region.
Iran’s ability to project influence in the eastern Mediterranean was dealt a further significant blow at the end of the year. At least in part due to the series of damaging defeats inflicted by Israel against it and its proxies, Tehran was either unwilling or unable to come to the aid of Syrian President Bashir al-Assad in the face of a rebel advance that threatened his rule. Anti-government forces led by militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faced limited resistance from Syrian regime forces as they rapidly secured a succession of major cities, including Aleppo on 30 November, before taking the capital Damascus on 8 December and deposing Assad. Alignment with Assad was key to Iran’s ability to support Hezbollah in Lebanon, with his removal being a significant and further blow in terms of Tehran’s ability to maintain deterrence against Israel.
Although the end of the Assad regime’s 54-year rule and the establishment of Syria’s new transitional government met minimal resistance and turmoil, the year closed out with a high degree of uncertainty and intermittent fighting between remaining regime forces and various armed groups ongoing. Foreign forces have also intervened, with the U.S. striking remnant Islamic State (IS) factions to prevent the group from exploiting an expected power vacuum, as seen in the wake of the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War. Additionally, Israel has launched hundreds of strikes against Assad’s former weapons arsenal, destroying approximately 90% of the former regime’s munitions and weaponry.
Figure 2: Security heatmap of MENA for 2024
Source: ACLED
Figure 3: Most prevalent risks by country in 2024
Source: Alert:24
Syria: The Assad family’s regime was deposed after 54 years in power, following a lightning offensive by rebel fighters, capturing the country’s capital Damascus within two weeks. A transitional government has been established.
Israel / Lebanon: Israel commenced ground operations in southern Lebanon to force Hezbollah fighters north of the Litani River. A ceasefire agreement was ratified in November outlining the 60-day withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the relocation of Hezbollah fighters northwards.
Gaza: Israel continued its ground operations in Gaza against Hamas, refocusing its efforts on northern Gaza following the group’s resurgence in the area.
Yemen: The Iranian-backed Houthis continued their aerial attacks on merchant and naval vessels in Yemen’s adjacent waters. The group also targeted strategic sites in Israel with missiles and drones. These operations prompted several strikes from Israeli and U.S.-led coalition forces on occupied Yemeni territory.
Iran: Tehran carried out several series of aerial assaults on Israel, resulting in minimal casualties. Israel subsequently retaliated, damaging strategic military and energy infrastructure.
Iraq: Continued anti-IS operations carried out throughout the country with assistance from U.S. forces, as negotiations continued for the withdrawal of American troops.
Jordan: An attack on U.S. military outpost Tower 22 bordering Syria in January saw three soldiers killed and 47 others injured. The attack was later claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI).
North Africa: Multiple protests took place across the year in Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia over the rising cost of living and perceived inadequacies in each nation’s respective economic policies addressing this.
MENA: Major elections took place in 2024 in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania Tunisia, and Turkey.
In 2024, terrorism and political violence persisted as a critical concern across the region, shaped by ongoing conflicts, geopolitical rivalries, and the evolving strategies of non-state actors. While the intensity of violence has decreased in some areas, key trends highlight the enduring nature of the threat and the shifting tactics used by various actors.
Overall, consistent with recent trends, large-scale terror attacks were infrequent when compared to the last decade, when Iraq in particular faced a seemingly unrelenting series of mass-casualty attacks, mostly committed by IS. Although demonstrating that internationally supported efforts to dismantle transnational terror groups continued to be effective in limiting their capabilities, events during the year showed that their remnants, and local militants, remained capable of regular decentralized and asymmetric attacks, as well as much more occasional large-scale plots.
Figure 4: Middle East terror attacks and resulting casualties
Notably, IS continued to exploit governance gaps and the absence of rule of law in areas of Iraq and Syria, focusing on ambushes, assassinations, and sabotage, to destabilize rural and semi-urban areas. IS’ decentralized approach has allowed it to conduct such rudimentary activities despite significant territorial losses, whilst also making their presence more challenging to completely eradicate due to the absence of an easily identifiable leadership structure or strongholds to target.
The group’s Islamic State – Khorasan Province (IS-KP) branch also claimed responsibility for one of 2024’s most significant attacks, a twin-suicide bombing targeting a ceremony in January marking the assassination of Qasem Soleimani held in Kerman, Iran. The bombing killed at least 95 people and injured over 280 others. With the IS-KP center of gravity being Afghanistan and Pakistan, in Southern Asia, and the bombing involving foreign nationals that crossed into the country via Afghanistan, the attack highlighted that although the prevalence of international terrorism is reduced in the region, the underlying risk remains.
Iran’s regional influence has also shaped the security environment. The activities of Iranian-backed militias, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Syria, have further complicated efforts to stabilize the region. While these militias often serve Tehran’s geopolitical objectives, their actions have stoked sectarian tensions and heightened the confrontation between Iran and Western-aligned states. This rivalry fuels instability, not only through proxy conflicts but also by escalating regional political and economic uncertainty.
Turkey has witnessed heightened political violence, driven by Kurdish militant activity and the spillover effects of its cross-border military operations into its Middle East neighbors. Retaliatory attacks within Turkish borders and unrest linked to far-left groups have compounded the security challenges facing the state, reflecting a volatile and cyclical conflict dynamic.
The increasing use of drones by non-state actors across the region has introduced a new layer of complexity. Drones are now frequently deployed for reconnaissance and precision strikes, while other trends, such as attacks targeting critical infrastructure or high-profile business areas, have begun to emerge. This technological shift, combined with the unpredictability of extremist tactics, poses a direct threat to businesses and businesspeople operating in the region, especially in sectors reliant on stable supply chains or physical assets.
In 2024, the threat to Western powers and their interests in the MENA region remained pronounced. Militant groups continued to employ asymmetric tactics, including high-profile attacks on military bases, diplomatic missions, and energy infrastructure, as part of a broader strategy to undermine Western influence in the region. The conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Israel exacerbated anti-Western sentiment, which extremist groups leveraged to justify attacks on Western assets, while proxy forces such as Hezbollah orchestrated strikes to undermine regional stability and dissuade further Western engagement.
Kidnap for ransom cases across the MENA region in the last three months of 2024 dropped by a significant 72% compared to the previous quarter and were over 53% lower than in Q4 2023 (see figure 5). However, the number of cases in the region is likely underreported due to limited media coverage, especially in peripheral regions in Libya and Syria. Most kidnap for ransom cases in Q4 2024 were linked to political and intercommunal disputes, a trend that has remained consistent since Q3 2023. Whilst terrorism-related kidnaps do take place, they are mostly specific to Syria, and only accounted for 5.2% of reported cases in the region; however, this figure is significantly higher than the 0.7%, 1.4%, and 4.9% of cases recorded as being motivated by terrorism in Q3, Q2, and Q1, respectively.
Moreover, with over 36% of cases recorded as ’unidentified’, the number of kidnaps conducted by terrorist groups is probably slightly higher. This spike in cases is likely related to an urgent need by terrorist groups in Syria to fund their activities, as armed violence in the country began to surge ahead of the collapse of the Syrian regime. Meanwhile, groups traditionally associated with kidnap for ransom across most of the world – organized crime groups and those termed as “banditry” – were also responsible for a low proportion of the reported identified cases in the region, although this may rise in the coming quarters due to the ongoing fragile and disorientated security environment seen in places like Syria and Lebanon.
Figure 5: Kidnap perpetrator / motivation in MENA in Q4 by percentage
Source: Alert:24/AKE
The current situation of instability and uncertainty in Syria presents considerable concern for the region leading into 2025, as the direction and efficacy of the transitional government's policies is yet to be proven. It is unknown whether HTS together with Syria’s new government will continue to moderate its political objectives. A failure to do so will jeopardize Syria’s prospects of integrating into the global community and undermine the country’s status on the international stage. This in turn will proliferate instability and unrest nationwide, tarnishing hopes of reform following 13 years of civil war.
Additionally, while reduced Iranian and Russian influence in Syria as a byproduct of Assad’s ouster is perceived as positive by much of the Western international community in particular, their presence likely contributed towards the reduction in threats posed by terrorist groups like IS. Radical groups such as IS will likely exploit power vacuums in the country, and the direction the new Syrian government takes will significantly influence the ability of the international community to support them. Should an environment permissive to the reemergence and expansion of IS develop from the current situation, insurgent activity and ideological influence could also pose challenges to neighboring states and international actors attempting to stabilize the region.
Stability between Israel and Lebanon will continue to be undermined by frequent contraventions of the recently ratified ceasefire agreement. Israel has previously asserted its willingness to recommence ground operations in southern Lebanon if Hezbollah forces begin to mount a resurgence in the region. Additionally, recent aerial attacks by Hezbollah against Israeli positions in its northern regions will continue to threaten either party's adherence to the ceasefire agreement.
Looking beyond these specific flashpoints, the broader MENA region remains fraught with interlinked security challenges. In Lebanon, as well as across other conflict-affected areas, the persistence of fragile governance structures, sectarian divisions, and proxy interventions will likely exacerbate instability. For North Africa, the relative calm seen in recent months could be disrupted by lingering socio-economic grievances, weak institutional capacity, and indirect spillover effects from the Sahel, such as trafficking networks and extremist group activities.
Businesses operating in the region must remain acutely aware of these risks, particularly in high-conflict zones, and adopt proactive measures to mitigate potential disruptions. Enhanced monitoring of geopolitical developments, risk-based security protocols, and contingency planning will be critical for navigating an increasingly volatile landscape.
