Europe’s security landscape in 2023 continued to be overshadowed by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, in addition to political and economic uncertainty fuelling civil unrest in the vast majority of European countries. Active assailant incidents represented the most notable increase, with 10 recorded incidents and significantly more casualties compared to 2022. The Israel-Hamas conflict acted as a flashpoint for Islamist extremism in Europe, predominantly in France and Belgium, showcasing the impact of regional conflicts on Europe’s security.
A diverse security landscape will persist in 2024, likely to be dominated by a protracted inter-state conflict in Ukraine and rising political violence risks stemming from an uncertain economic recovery and Europe's increasingly fractured political sphere. These factors will also contribute towards a fertile breeding ground for various forms of extremism, increasing the likelihood of terror-related incidents.
The latter stages of 2023 represented an increasingly heightened risk of terrorism in Europe, largely due to the outbreak of the conflict between Israel-Hamas in October and its wider socio-religious implications across European societies. As in previous years, Islamist extremism remained the primary terroristic threat in Europe in 2023, with activity linked to extreme right-wing terrorism (ERWT) also continuing to pose a persistent threat, however, the majority of ERWT activity failed to materialise into any significant action. Countries including France, Belgium, Sweden, and the Netherlands increased their respective terrorism threat levels in response to attacks in 2023 and risks associated to the Israel-Hamas conflict. The conflict exacerbated tensions amongst segments of European society, heightening levels of antisemitism and Islamophobia, as well as creating an environment conducive to extremist terrorism – with three of four Islamist extremist attacks reported in Europe taking place in the weeks and months following the 7 October attacks in Israel:
2 December: Two people were fatally stabbed and one other injured in an attack near the Eiffel Tower in Paris, France. The suspect had reportedly pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) on social media.
18 October: A suspect fatally stabbed a teacher and wounded several others in a terror attack at a school in Arras, northern France. Authorities confirmed the attack was directly linked to the Israel-Hamas conflict.
16 October: A gunman opened fire on three Swedish football fans in Brussels, Belgium, killing two and injuring the other. The attacker, who was later apprehended, was reportedly known to security services and suspected of having extremist links.
25 January: One person was killed, and four others injured in a machete attack in two churches in Algeciras, Spain. Authorities arrested the suspect on murder and terrorism charges.
Additionally, there were a number of thwarted attacks in Europe, most notably the arrest of seven suspected Hamas members in Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark in December that planned to attack Jewish sites. Moreover, German authorities arrested two suspects planning a terrorist attack against a Christmas market in the North Rhine-Westphalia state.
Of the attacks recorded, all were deemed Self-Initiated Terrorist (S-IT) attacks, employing rudimentary methods, such as knives, and targeting publicly accessible locations. In recent years, less sophisticated attacks have become the main approach for terrorists in Europe. This shift is credited to the improved and strong security measures adopted to prevent large-scale terrorist incidents, like the 2015 Paris attack. In addition, due to the nature of low-sophistication S-IT attacks, which typically entail less communication and preparation compared to more complex plots, security forces are afforded less opportunity to detect and disrupt them. From a geographical standpoint, major urban centres in Europe with large Muslim populations displayed greater levels of support for the pro-Palestine movement at the onset of the Israel-Hamas conflict, including – but not limited to – Paris and Brussels, which witnessed the bulk of Islamist extremist attacks in Europe in 2023.
On ERWT, one attack was recorded in Europe in 2023:
5 May: A suspect reportedly wearing items of clothing bearing neo-Nazi symbols fatally shot eight people and wounded 14 others in Dubona, Serbia.
The ongoing polarisation of the European political landscape continued to drive risks associated to ERWT in 2023. Counter-terrorism operations, both domestic and EUROPOL-led, resulted in a number of thwarted attacks, including an Anders Breivik-styled 2012 attack in Hungary by a Norwegian suspect, a planned arson attack against a left-wing establishment in Nottingham, U.K. and a planned mass-casualty attack in the state of Hesse, Germany by a suspect motivated by antisemitic ideology. Furthermore, EUROPOL arrested five suspects across Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Lithuania, Romania, and Italy in relation to the dissemination of ERW propaganda, active recruitment, and sharing manuals of 3D printed firearms.
Low-complexity S-IT incidents targeting publicly accessible areas are likely to remain the most prominent form of attack by terrorists in Europe in 2024, with Islamist extremism set to remain as the primary propagator of terrorism in the region. However, ERWT could also witness an increase in 2024 as significant shifts in European domestic politics could galvanise hostile actors to prepare and commit ERWT attacks. Similarly despite being sparse in 2023, incidents related to Left Wing, Anarchist and Single-Issue Terrorism (LASIT) cannot be ruled out in 2024 due to aforementioned political shifts.
The seemingly intertwining distinctions between different forms of terrorism highlights the growing levels of convergence of extremist ideologies. Shared characteristics, such as similar propaganda narratives, target selection, recruitment strategies, and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) could become more pronounced in 2024. Regions outside Europe that are susceptible to adverse political and security risks could be exploited by extremist groups to drive support and recruitment efforts in Europe. As their operational capabilities intensify, Europe may face an increased risk of terrorism in 2024. From a geographic context, central Europe will likely continue to act as a hotspot for Islamist extremism-based terrorism due to its concentration of Muslim communities, whereas ERWT will likely represent a broader geographical risk in Europe, particularly in countries where far-right parties are gaining increased traction amongst the voting population.
A total of 11 active assailant (AA) events were recorded in Europe in 2023, signalling a marked increase compared to 2022’s five AA events. Moreover, 2023 witnessed significantly more casualties, with targeted locations including public transport networks, educational facilities, residential areas, and places of worship.
Notable active assailant incidents in 2023
Source: Data taken from multiple sources: See incident summaries
21 December: In the Czech Republic’s worst mass attack, a suspect fatally shot 14 people and wounded 25 others in a mass shooting at the Charles University in Prague.
23 November: A suspect stabbed five people, including children, outside a school in Dublin, Ireland.
28 September: Three people were fatally shot in two shooting sprees by a student close to the Erasmus University in Rotterdam, Netherlands.
13 June: A man stabbed two students to death, before killing another man and using his stolen van to run down and injure three others, in an attack spanning three different areas of Nottingham, U.K.
8 June: Four children wounded in stabbing attack in a playground in Annecy, France.
3 May: A suspect fatally shot eight fellow pupils and a security guard at the Vladislav Ribnikar Model Elementary School in Belgrade, Serbia.
30 April: One person was killed and seven people were injured in a stabbing attack in a nightclub in Bodmin, U.K. The suspect was arrested on suspicion of murder.
9 March: A former Jehovah Witness opened fire at a Jehovah Witness worship hall in Hamburg, Germany, killing six people and wounding eight others.
30 January: Three people were wounded in a stabbing attack in a metro station near the European Commission in Brussels, Belgium. Authorities confirmed there was no indication the incident was terrorism related.
25 January: A stabbing attack on a train travelling from Kiel to Hamburg, Germany resulted in two deaths and five injuries. The suspect was charged with murder and attempted murder.
11 January: Six people were injured in a stabbing attack at the Gare du Nord train station in Paris, France.
Over half of the above listed events bear similar hallmarks to terrorist attacks, being low-complexity and self-initiated in nature, in addition to the types of targets selected. As such, the distinctions between terrorist attacks and AA events are often difficult to distinguish at the point of attack. Causes behind AA events are often found in mental health concerns, personal hardship, and other often unique pathways that increase the propensity to commit an AA event. Similarly, radicalisation pathways into terrorism are often precipitated by mental health and personal hardship factors – further emphasising the similarities between AA events and terrorism prior to identifying motive(s).
The risk of AA events will almost certainly persist in Europe in 2024 due to overall uncertainty linked to political and economic drivers. Increasing polarisation of domestic politics could continue to induce an atmosphere of uncertainty which could be worsened by ongoing economic insecurity in some countries. Combined, these factors could increase the propensity of AA events in vulnerable individuals.
Throughout 2023, as in previous recent years, economic pressures, political turbulence, environmental concerns, and social inequality continued to act as drivers behind most cases of unrest across much of Europe. In the latter part of the year, the eruption of the Israel-Hamas conflict, which has long been an emotive issue especially within the continent’s more diverse states – notably in France and the U.K. – served to motivate significant protests and demonstrations.
Civil unrest risk levels in Europe
Source: Alert:24 Risk Intelligence Platform
France experienced the most civil unrest in 2023 stemming from the controversial pension reforms and pro-Palestine movement born of the Israel-Hamas conflict (prior to being blanket banned by French courts on 18 October) though the cost of living continued to prompt strike action within the transport, energy, and education sectors. Additionally, significant demonstrations erupted over excessive police violence concerning the fatal shooting of a teenager in Paris, where major urban centres nationally, particularly Paris, experienced high levels of violence, criminal damage, looting and arson in the wake of the shooting. On pro-Palestine demonstrations, major urban centres in France experienced demonstrations supporting the perceived plight of Palestine at the onset of Israel’s invasion of the Gaza Strip – though most were conducted peacefully despite sporadic reports of violence and criminal damage.
In the U.K., strike action conducted by transport, healthcare, and education sector workers continued in 2023 over the sustained, though somewhat subdued, cost of living crisis. Environmental activism was more prominent in the U.K. compared to the rest of Europe, with Extinction Rebellion (XR) remaining at the forefront. However, despite a near-record attendance to its ‘The Big One’ four-day action in April, XR failed to draw any significant support beyond its core support groups. Additionally, Just Stop Oil (JSO) activists continued to target high-profile events/locations, including – but not limited to – cricket’s Ashes Test and the National Gallery, using their symbolic orange paint to generate considerable media coverage in the process. Pro-Palestine movements staged a number of large-scale protests in London in response to Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip. Despite sporadic arrests by police, most demonstrations were conducted peacefully.
Elsewhere, Spain, Serbia, Ireland, and Poland experienced elevated levels of civil unrest in major urban centres relating to issues ranging from anti-immigration to perceived poor governance. These issues will likely continue to dominate grievances driving respective bouts of civil unrest in 2024, with related developments and/or significant events capable of acting as flashpoints for bouts of civil unrest.
Economic strain associated to the cost of living crisis will likely persist in 2024, however, inflation in Europe is expected to decline from 5.4% in 2023 to 2.7% in 2024, according to figures from the European Central Bank. The impact of the anticipated decline on the manifestation of economy-driven civil unrest remains uncertain due to activist groups continuing to link themes and narratives to poor economic performance, with said groups likely to continue to exploit the perception of a weakened economy to drive support and action irrespective of more positive economic recovery.
The Israel-Hamas conflict will almost certainly continue deep into 2024, where a military occupation of the Gaza Strip remains the most likely course of action once Israel has deemed to have achieved its military objectives. In turn, this will likely initiate further pro-Palestine civil unrest in Europe, though support and attendance levels may vary compared to previous bouts of civil unrest at the onset of the conflict. In addition, the conflict highlights the effects of global developments on regional interactions and how Europe’s security landscape is fundamentally dictated by events beyond its borders. Further conflicts or significant security events in regions with links to Europe could induce an uptick in civil unrest in Europe in 2024.
The divergence of European politics could become more acute in 2024 with populism set to gain a greater foothold in the European political sphere. Far-right parties in Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Poland are expected to play a major role in national politics over the coming year. Moreover, European parliamentary elections in June could be dominated by far-right parties with high levels of a variety of socio-economic factors pushing voters towards hardline candidates promoting decisive action to tackle issues such as immigration, the economy, and more. Significant political events and elections could act as flashpoints for unrest, increasing the likelihood of counter-protests and therefore violence, clashes, criminal damage, and arson.
Risks associated with the Russia-Ukraine conflict remained mostly concentrated along the frontlines, which have largely remained static throughout 2023. Russia renewed its offensive in February, concentrating on the Donbas and Donetsk Oblasts and capturing Bakhmut – a city which had been increasingly contested over a several month-long period. In response, the West, largely driven by the U.S., announced fresh sanctions. NATO later announced increased support of Ukraine’s war efforts providing anti-air defence systems, long-range artillery/missiles, tanks and other vehicles and equipment, as well as pledging to begin delivering fighter jets in 2024. Ukraine’s long-anticipated counteroffensive in the summer failed to reach similar levels of success in the previous campaign in the autumn and winter of 2022. However, Ukraine achieved some success in the Black Sea, significantly damaging the Kerch Bridge in addition to the Novocherkassk landing ship in Feodosia, Crimea. In June, the Kakhovka Dam in the Kherson Oblast was damaged in an explosion by suspected Russian forces resulting in severe environmental, agricultural and residential damage.
Density of recorded rocket, missile, drone and artillery incidents at district-level in 2023
Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Significant battles have taken place over the past year in the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk oblasts, particularly around Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Moreover, the past 12 months have seen the conflict become more of a war of attrition, with the use of artillery and defensive lines and tactics such as minefields and trenches largely characterising recent fighting between the two sides. Long range attacks by both Ukraine and Russia had varying degrees of impact, with Russia predominantly striking energy infrastructure, military interests, and civilian targets in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces launched a barrage of drones in August against six regions, including Moscow, and recently struck the city of Belgorod killing 25 – showcasing Ukraine’s intent at striking targets in Russian territory and possessing the resources necessary to achieve this.
The conflict is likely to remain in a state of attrition in 2024, with Russian forces continuing to build fortified positions in captured territory and Ukrainian forces preventing Russian forces from advancing any further. However, support for Ukraine could begin to dwindle with the prospect of political pressure emanating from largely populist politicians who have adopted a critical position regarding military support for Ukraine. The prospect of Donald Trump re-emerging as President in the U.S.’ 2024 Presidential elections could see a decrease in the level of support offered to Ukraine by the U.S. – by far the largest and most important Ukrainian ally. Long range airstrikes will almost certainly continue in 2024, as Russia will likely want to maintain pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure.
