The political landscape remained unstable in much of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in 2023, with many countries experiencing rising levels of insecurity. Indeed, a deadly confluence of factors such as lack of economic opportunities, political infighting, resource scarcity, ethno-religious tensions, and inadequate provision of security and basic services by the state, meant that SSA experienced several government overthrowals, alongside several attempted coup d’états, a major internal conflict, and enduring threats from violent non-state actors.
Sudan, a country which experienced two coups in 2019 and 2021 respectively, saw a large-scale conflict break out in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Since early 2022, the leader of the SAF, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the leader of the RSF, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, had been ruling Sudan, whilst ostensibly also overseeing Sudan’s transition into democratic governance. However, tensions between the two parties grew throughout the first quarter of the year, largely over disagreements on the roles each party would play in the future elected government and military.
Major conflict eventually broke out on 15 April, when fighting began in the capital Khartoum and quickly spread across the country. The rapid descent into mass violence quickly plunged the country into a major humanitarian crisis, with widespread insecurity, food and medicine shortages and a breakdown in law affecting tens of millions. Members of the international community soon sought to repatriate their citizens. Evacuation efforts were initially difficult and dangerous, as Khartoum and the country’s largest airport, Khartoum International Airport (KRT) witnessed heavy fighting almost immediately after hostilities broke out. The battle for control of the facility, which was also used as an airbase by the SAF, left numerous aircraft destroyed, including eight civilian commercial aircraft – totalling hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of loss.
The battle for KRT left the airport inoperable and the conflict closed Sudanese airspace. Consequently, those seeking to evacuate their citizens from country were faced with a complex task. Some countries opted to evacuate via Port Sudan, a city relatively unaffected by the conflict, or via the Wadi Seidna airfield near Khartoum. Despite the presence of foreign troops, a Turkish evacuation plane was shot at whilst landing at the base, sustaining moderate damage but resulting in no casualties. Evacuation efforts were largely successful yet underscored the variety of hazards facing foreign nationals and interests compelled to navigate an active warzone.
The conflict in Sudan has continued to rage despite sustained international efforts to mediate a permanent cessation in hostilities. At least 12,000 people have been left dead due to the fighting, with millions more displaced. The conflict has also seen at least one ethnically motivated mass killing by the RSF in the Darfur region that purportedly left 1,300 dead. Moreover, persistent violent clashes and battles for key sites in Khartoum and other areas of the country have done extensive damage to Sudan’s physical landscape, with many hospitals, skyscrapers, airports, and schools being destroyed in the fighting. Similarly, major infrastructure and key industries have been significantly impacted by the conflict. Moreover, the Jebel Awlia Dam south of Khartoum sustained serious damage – threatening a major flooding of the White Nile and the Al Jaili oil refinery, a joint venture between Sudan and China, experienced a massive fire which destroyed many of its central storage facilities.
Efforts to bring a permanent cessation in hostilities remain ongoing. However, as previous attempts at bringing lasting peace have failed, it is likely that a mediated conclusion to the conflict will remain elusive for at least the near term. Indeed, at the time of writing the conflict is displaying signs of expanding further east, into territory under control of the SAF, increasing the probability that the situation will worsen and present longer-term consequences.
Sudan remained the largest conflict that broke out in SSA over the past year, although there were numerous flashpoints across the region which threatened further destabilisation. Indeed, after bringing a concrete end to conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region via peace deal in late 2022, there were widespread fears in August that conflict might erupt in the country again after bouts of violence broke out in the Amhara region. The clashes led the government to declare a state of emergency and move troops to stabilise the situation. Major conflict in the Amhara has yet to occur and Ethiopia’s security environment notably improved – recording 1,171 civilian deaths in 2023 compared to 2,988 in 2022. However, the potential remains for widespread fighting to erupt in one of Africa’s largest economies in the future – a prospect that would likely have wide-ranging implications for the surrounding region.
Attempted and successful coups 2022-2023
Source: BBC News
While Sudan and Ethiopia have provided prominent examples of how underlying tensions can rapidly escalate to threaten security and stability, as was the case in 2022, evidence of political unrest and upheaval was widespread in SSA during 2023. Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau all reported attempts to overthrow their respective governments. While these attempts were not ultimately successful, Gabon and Niger did experience cases of enforced regime change. In August, the Gabonese military deposed former leader Ali Bongo after he was declared victorious just days earlier in an alleged fraudulent election. The coup d’état, which was largely welcomed by the Gabonese public, ended 55-years of Bongo family rule over one of Africa’s leading oil producers. Current leader General Brice Oligui Nguema has pledged to transition to civilian power within two years yet remains under sanctions from the Economic Community of Central African States.
Niger also experienced significant political turmoil in 2023 when on 26 July, the government led by President Mohamed Bazoum was overthrown via a military coup d’état headed by General Abdourahamane Tiani. The acquisition of power by the military was largely peaceful and was seemingly triggered by the intentions of Bazoum to overhaul the structure of the military leadership, although the leaders of the coup publicly cited poor economic conditions and rising levels of insecurity in the country as the motivators for their move.
Such overthrowals have not been uncommon in recent years in SSA, however, Niger was the last remaining country in the Central Sahel region headed by a democratically elected leader, with neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso also having experienced military takeovers in 2021 and 2022 respectively. In an unprecedented move, the regional bloc Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) issued an ultimatum to the junta, stating they would intervene militarily to reinstate former President Bazoum should the military not relinquish power. Although the bloc ultimately opted not to follow through on this threat, the coup in Niger drastically raised the possibility of SSA experiencing a rare inter-state conflict. ECOWAS and some of the Western community ultimately decided to impose sanctions on the military junta.
Prior to the coup, Niger was the only country in the Central Sahel region that remained in active partnership with the U.S., France, and the wider Western community, with neighbouring military leaders in Mali and Burkina Faso recently decoupling from traditional partners. The new administration under Tiani quickly chose to follow to the same path, ordering France to withdraw its ambassador and troops from the country. The Tiani-led administration remains in power and under his rule Niger has continued to distance itself from the West and the ECOWAS community. The U.S. military maintains a presence in the country, although for how long this will continue is unclear. Despite claims by the junta that the country was facing rising insecurity from Islamist groups, attacks in Niger were on the decline and notably lower than Mali and Burkina Faso – arguably due to the presence of Western militaries. Soon after the coup, Niger experienced a number of mass-casualty terrorist attacks after the military leaders recalled troops to the capital to protect their position- potentially signalling that Islamist groups will see the country under military rule as an ideal target in the coming months.
Violence and insecurity, largely caused by internal conflicts and terrorism, have continued to cause widespread issues for much of SSA. Countries such as Burkina Faso; Sudan; Ghana; Uganda; Togo; Niger; Kenya; and Benin all recorded notable rises in civilian fatalities over the past year. A variety of factors may have caused these rises, however, many of these increases can be explained by the growing proliferation of Islamist terrorist groups in the region.
Conflict and violence against civilians heatmap
Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
West Africa alone recorded over 1,800 terrorist attacks in the first six months of 2023 resulting in 4,600 deaths. Within West Africa, the Sahel region, which includes countries such as Mali; Burkina Faso; Niger; Chad; as well as parts of northern Nigeria, has continued to serve of the epicentre for many of the SSA’s terrorist incidents. From the beginning of the year until late November, the Sahel saw over 8,000 deaths attributed to Jihadist terrorist groups, up 15% from 2022 and making it the deadliest year since records began in 2017 by a considerable margin.
Burkina Faso was among the worst affected by Salafi-Jihadist groups such as Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), with JNIM purported to control at least 40% of the country. In 2023 the country experienced an increase in civilian fatalities of over 25% – which grew from 1,418 to 2,051 and accounted for approximately 62% of the Central Sahel’s deaths from armed violence. Moreover, in 2022 the country noted just over 4,000 conflict fatalities, this number had almost reached 8,000 by November 2023.
SSA civilian fatalities
Source: Alert:24 Risk Intelligence Platform
While regions in the north of Burkina Faso continue to be most affected, there have also been a notable number of attacks and fatalities in the south of the country, close to the borders with Benin, Togo, and Ghana. These countries have all noted an increase in civilian fatalities over the past year and have become increasingly concerned with the expansion of JNIM and ISGS into their territory. Indeed, only Ghana, whose fatality increase can be explained in part by ongoing intercommunal tensions in Bawku close to the border with Burkina Faso, has yet to suffer a cross-border attack or incursion.
Jihadist groups have managed to drastically expand their territorial control in the Central Sahel by exploiting systemic flaws in national political systems and state security apparatuses, as well as localised ethno-religious grievances between communities and/or the state itself. With the number of incidents involving Islamist groups rising by more than 70% on the year prior in Benin, Togo recording 20 terrorist attacks by November, and fears over the exploitable intercommunal violence in northern Ghana, the littoral states along Burkina Faso’s southern border could come become further impacted by Islamist terrorism in the near-to-medium term future.
Terrorism risk levels in Sub-Saharan Africa
Mali, which witnessed its deadliest year on record in 2022, recorded a decrease in civilian fatalities, as well as in the frequency and deadliness of armed violence incidents in 2023. However, by October 2023 the country had still recorded over 3,000 deaths from armed violence – an elevated figure compared to much of the wider world. Mali remains highly insecure, with the resumption of conflict between the state and northern-based Tuareg rebels being a notable development in 2023. Conflict between the same set of actors was a cataclysmic event for SSA in the early 2010s and paved the way for the expansion of Jihadist groups throughout the region – this conflict and the emergence of Islamist militants prompted two French-led military interventions in the Sahel throughout the 2010s, the second of which – Operation Barkhane - ended fully in 2022 after the ruling military junta ordered their withdrawal from the country.
2023 also saw the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) end its peacekeeping mission in the country after 10 years. The gradual withdrawal of MINUSMA throughout the second half of 2023 saw the injuries to scores of peacekeepers and led to increased violence as rebel and terrorist groups fought the Malian military for control of strategic bases left behind by the taskforce. The withdrawal of this mission, alongside ongoing terrorist campaigns and renewed rebel violence in the north of the country, means Mali is likely to see further heightened levels of fatalities and violence in the coming year. Indeed, while the country joined a growing number of African countries by turning to the infamous Russian mercenary organisation – Wagner Group – to help tackle high levels of insecurity, Wagner troops and the Malian military have been accused of a list of human rights abuses including extrajudicial killings of civilians. Such acts only serve to further perpetuate ongoing cycles of violence and will likely push swathes of the population into the hands of terrorist and rebel groups.
MINUSMA was largely unable to quell the rising levels of violence and fatalities in Mali and was ultimately forced to leave by the ruling administration. Mali was not alone in expelling an international peacekeeping force from its borders in 2023. Indeed, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) enacted a similar move, ordering the United Nations Organization Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) taskforce to begin withdrawing from the country and declined to extend the mandate of an East African Community Regional Force.
These peacekeeping forces were in the DRC after conflict resumed in the eastern DRC between M23 rebels and government troops, resulting in widespread conflict that contributed to the deaths of at least 3,320 civilians in 2022. The taskforces were also combatting the perennial threats posed by over 120 armed groups active in the region. The conflict between M23 and Congolese forces persisted throughout 2023 and groups such as the Islamic State affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continued to attack the eastern DRC, however, the number of civilian deaths did reduce to 2,547. Despite this, the Congolese government has said the missions did not adequately protect civilians. The steady withdrawal of these forces throughout 2024 means violence and conflict are likely to rise once again in the resource-rich DRC, a country which also saw notable political unrest following recent presidential elections which re-elected Felix Tshisekedi.
Similarly, Somalia continued to battle the powerful Islamist militant group al-Shabaab throughout 2023. The past 12 months saw the Somali military, aided by support from an African Union peacekeeping mission, achieve a mixture of results, initially launching a successful offensive against the group in the centre of the country which stalled later in the year. Al-Shabaab remain a prominent threat in the country, increasing the use of rocket and bomb and attacks in Mogadishu and launching attacks on high-profile politicians, although civilian deaths in 2023 decreased marginally from the year prior, going from 2,944 to 2,477, while political violence incidents also decreased from 912 to 660. The African Union taskforce is due to leave at the end of 2024, this coupled with persistent droughts, floods, and mass displacement, means Somalia is likely to face serious security, economic, and humanitarian issues in the coming year.
Mozambique continued to face security threats posed by terrorist linked to the Islamic State. Mozambique requested external support due to an ongoing Islamist insurgency in the oil-rich Cabo Delgado which has persistently attacked civilians, state institutions and private companies and individuals since 2017. This ongoing threat has continuously impacted natural gas projects worth billions of USD and looks likely to continue to do so in the coming year.
Finally, Africa’s largest economy Nigeria had a turbulent year. In early February, violent protests took place across the country after millions faced widespread cash shortages due a government attempt to redesign the Nigerian Naira. Just weeks later, national elections were held on 25 February seeing Bola Tinubu elected as president. The election was tarnished by violence which caused scores of deaths and injuries. Voter suppression and intimidation was also reported, with the ballot being heavily protested by the opposition and their supporters. In total over 700 people were arrested as a result.
The country continued to face a variety of security threats in the form of Islamist groups such as Islamic State Western Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram, as well as gangs of armed criminals locally known as ‘bandits’. However, continued counter-terrorism operations have meant the number of incidents targeting civilians and the number of civilian fatalities in 2023 decreased from the year prior from 2,183 to 1,901 and from 3,952 to 2,705 respectively. Despite this decrease, these numbers remain high compared to much of the wider world and the country continues to experience near-daily mass killings and kidnapping of civilians.
Kidnap for ransom remained among the most prominent threats in the region. Indeed, despite being notoriously difficult to fully track due to chronic issues of underreporting, countries such as South Africa, Cameroon, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, the DRC, and Benin have also continued to experience heightened numbers of kidnappings comparative to much of the wider world.
South Africa is believed to have highest levels of this incident type in SSA, with South African police recording 8,154 kidnappings over a six-month period between April and September – a 7.7% increase on the same period the year prior1. While the high rate of kidnaps observed in South Africa reflects the high levels of criminality present in the country, the motivations behind kidnaps across SSA states varies, typically influenced by their respective security perils. For example, an increasing number of kidnappings has been logged in Sudan as the conflict there continues, with the RSF reported to be behind 70% of cases that occurred in the final three months of 2023. Notably, on 15 October, the RSF conducted a mass kidnapping of 18 civilians in Khartoum.
Similarly, long-standing ethnic divisions in Ethiopia continue to prompt politically motivated cases of kidnapping, as the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) rebel group – the main kidnap and ransom perpetrators in the country – attempt to pressure the federal government to make concessions on their aspirations for greater regional autonomy in Oromia. On 12 and 13 November, OLA militants kidnapped an estimated 54 ethnic Amhara civilians in Dera Woreda. On 21 November, ongoing peace talks between the OLA and the government ended without a peace agreement. The conflicts will likely intensify in both Amhara and Oromia regions, increasing the risk of more kidnappings and attacks on minorities, likely resulting in a continuation of the uptick in cases seen between the third and fourth quarters of 2023.
Nigeria also continues to be a kidnapping hotspot, driven by the activities of ISWAP, armed bandits and intercommunal violence between farmers and herders in the North-Central region. While locals faced the highest risk, there were also cases of foreign nationals being targeted. On 12 December, two South Korean nationals were kidnapped in the Niger Delta when their convoy was ambushed by armed assailants who killed four soldiers and two civilian drivers. On 29 December, South Korean authorities confirmed that they had secured their custody; however, they did not state if any ransom was paid. ISWAP, its affiliates and unidentified armed assailants will continue to drive the high risk of kidnapping in the country in 2024.
1 South African Police States
The political and security landscape in SSA looks unlikely to improve in the near-to-medium term future. Indeed, Sudan offered an example of how quickly countries in the region can descend into full-blown conflict. The civil war in the country seems far from reaching its conclusion, with the RSF, an entity that have been accused of human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing, demonstrating that they currently hold initiative in the conflict by taking Sudan’s second largest city – Wadi Madani – at the end of 2023. International efforts led by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have proved inconclusive thus far meaning conflict may persist until either side reaches definitive victory, or the war becomes a stalemate.
Similar to the eruption of conflict in Sudan, coups in Gabon and Niger demonstrated the speed in which major shifts in country’s internal politics can shift without prior warning. The coups were the seventh and eighth to take place in a former French African colony in just three years, continuing a growing trend of military depositions across SSA. While major threats were made toward the junta in Niger by the U.S. and ECOWAS, the current administration emerged largely unscathed after overthrowing the Central Sahel’s last democratically elected leader. The inability of the international community to prevent or coerce the junta from remaining in power will likely prompt further coup d’états in the coming year. Indeed, the three attempted coups in 2023 highlights that such transfers of power are likely to remain an endemic in the region for the foreseeable future.
Islamist terrorism continued to rage across the SSA, with countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Somalia, and Nigeria remaining the hotspots for this growing issue. With the military leaders of the three Central Sahelian countries choosing to distance themselves further from traditional Western partners, the West finds itself increasingly unable to act to stop the spread of these groups. Mali and Burkina Faso have been particularly ravaged by these militant groups who become increasingly more powerful and audacious in their actions. With Benin, Togo, and Ghana recording a growing number of deaths and incidents related to terrorism, there are growing anxieties that one or more of West Africa’s littoral states may be the next victim of the groups like JNIM and ISGS. The notion has been recognised by the U.S., who are scrambling to find new locations for a drone base currently in Niger in countries like Benin, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. A relocation to one of these nations may help these states in their fight, but to counter the spread of Islamist groups these countries to prepare in several additional ways.
Kidnap for ransom remains rife in SSA and is highly likely to be a far bigger issue that numbers suggest. Kidnaps are likely to continue to pose a major issue for those in the region, with factors such as climate change, economic difficulties, and political fragmentation all pushing groups to conduct these actions. Moreover, as Islamist groups continue to expand, likely so too are the numbers of this incident, with kidnaps providing a lucrative income stream and way of coercing local populations into accepting their control. While locals will remain most impacted by this issue, foreigners will likely remain an ideal target for kidnappers due to their perceived wealth – a cause for concern for countries and organisations seeking to operate in the region that is increasingly being recognised for its wealth of natural resources, economic opportunities, and potentially growing role in the global economy.
